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Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview
1.1. Introduction
In 2015, the market reacted negatively to aviation stocks after a Germanwings pilot
deliberately crashed an aircraft with 150 people on board into the French Alps (Welle,
2015). This shows that firms do not always benefit from their rivals’ failures and that a
failure can sometimes adversely affect an entire industry. Called the "contagion effect", or
in short, "contagion", this phenomenon has attracted considerable interest in research about
financial crises and how effects spread through company networks. The concept of
contagion was first used in the financial economics field by David Ricardo in 1797, who
witnessed a panic leading to the suspension of deposit withdrawals by the Bank of England
(Kelly and Grada, 2000). However, "contagion" became a common term after July 1997,
when it was used to describe the rapid spread of a financial crisis that began in Thailand,
moving throughout East Asia and then on to Russia and Brazil (Claessens and Forbes,
2001).
There is no universally accepted definition of contagion in the literature;1 however, in
general, contagion refers to the spread of an effect or behavior throughout a network. In
this paper, contagion means the propagation of adverse consequences of a firm’s failure to
the other firms in the same industry. Given this definition, contagion can also be called the
"secondary effect", as opposed to the "primary effect", which refers to an event’s impact on
1

Forbes and Rigobon (2002) consider that contagion is only true contagion if there is no dependence between
the markets prior to the shock. In this case, contagion is a pronounced increase in the dependence of the
markets. Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) consider that contagion can be described as an excess of correlation
between markets, more than it can be explained by economic fundamentals. Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia
(2005) regard contagion as a break in the parameters governing the correlation system. Kaminsky, Reinhart
and Vegh (2003) define contagion as the instant effect following a shock that progresses rapidly between the
markets. According to this approach, if the propagation is gradual to the other markets, episodes cannot be
regarded as contagion, but as a spillover episode.
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the liable firm. Like other risks, contagion risk can be measured either by its probability or
by the combination of its probability and impact.
Contagion is different from spillover. Spillover happens when an effect automatically
spreads to other firms through fundamental links, whereas contagion occurs when the
impact involves judgment and decision making and spreads through behavioral or social
mechanisms. For example, when two firms share a supplier, one firm’s failure can distress
the supplier’s operations. When the supplier’s operational distress automatically leads to a
supply disruption for the second firm, the effect is called spillover. However, when the
supplier decides to suspend or terminate the supply to the second firm, the effect is called
contagion (see Figure 1-1).

Figure 1-1: Spillover vs. Contagion

The scope of contagion can vary from a specific sector of the economy (sectoral
contagion) limited to a particular industry (e.g., the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in
1979)2, geographical region (e.g., Toyota’s acceleration pedal recall in 2009)3, or market

2

The accident crystallized anti-nuclear safety concerns among activists and the general public, resulted in
new regulations for the nuclear industry, and has been cited as a contributor to the decline of a new reactor
construction program that was already underway in the 1970s (Severnini, 2017).

2

(e.g., the U.S. mad cow crisis in 2003)4, to an entire economy (e.g., September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks).
Beyond operational failure, contagion can also happen because of an operational
breach. For example, Volkswagen’s software manipulation of diesel vehicles resulted in an
emission scandal that caused the market to react to other German automobile
manufacturers (Trefis, 2015). In this study, "failure" refers to both operational failure and
operational breach.
Contagion is generated by a triggering event which, in turn, is caused by an initiating
event (Figure 1-2). For example, the Fukushima Nuclear disaster in 2011 involved a
tsunami (an initiating event) that caused explosions (a triggering event), which ultimately
led to the shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan (a contagion effect). This
distinction is very important from the risk management perspective, because initiation
events are difficult to control, while triggering events are generally controllable.

Figure 1-2: Sequence of events in the contagion process

Since the triggering event is subject to the initiating event, the probability of contagion
is ultimately characterized by the initiating event. If the probability of the initiating event is

3

A survey conducted on Toyota's accelerator pedal problem in 2009 showed that the public connected only
Asian automakers with the problem (Automotive News, 2010).
4

U.S. ranchers and processors lost almost $11 billion in revenue between 2004 and 2007 after major
importers barred U.S. beef following the discovery of mad cow disease in the United States (Doering, 2008).

3

known, the probability of contagion can be determined, and hence the focal firm is in a
"risk situation". Otherwise, the firm encounters an "uncertainty situation".5 The distinction
between risk and uncertainty situations may affect the focal firm’s decision analysis, but
such a distinction will not affect the possibility of identifying the contagion effect, so long
as the triggering event can be defined or simply constructed. For example, we know the
entire Japanese nuclear power industry will likely be shut down (a contagion effect) if
another accident similar to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster (2011) happens, whether or not
it is possible to determine the probability of large tsunamis.6
The review of contagion cases shows that contagion is manifest in at least three forms:
a) demand disruption; b) supply disruption; and c) operating cost increase. The review also
shows that there are at least three types of triggering events, i.e., i) product harm events, ii)
operating events, and iii) social/environmental events.7 Depending on the type of the
triggering event and the form of contagion manifestation, contagion can be classified into
nine types as exhibited in Table 1-1.
As depicted in Figure 1-3, the field of contagion risk management can be divided into
four areas, including: 1) contagion analysis, 2) contagion risk assessment, 3) contagion
measurement, and 4) contagion risk management strategies. Contagion analysis is mainly

5

In the literature, the word "risk" has been used to refer to different meanings. The most common uses are: 1)
Risk as a threat: "What risks threaten our business?", 2) Risk as probability: "What is the risk of going
bankrupt?", and 3) Risk as consequence: "What is the risk of non-compliance with emission regulations?".
However, in addition to these meanings, risk is also used to refer to a state. This refers to a situation where
the probabilities of the alternatives are known ex-ante or can be reliably estimated. Under this definition, risk
contrasts with uncertainty, which refers to a situation where probabilities are not measurable (Knight, 1921).
6

In the process of risk assessment, managers and decision-makers are sometimes more concerned with the
risk associated with a specific case under consideration, and not with the likelihood of the average outcomes
that may result from various risk situations.
7

Sometimes an initiating event can cause multiple simultaneous triggering events. For instance, following a
fire on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the oil rig sank (operational event) and more than five million
barrels of oil spilled into the sea (social event).
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about characterizing contagion and understanding the mechanisms of propagation and
elements involved in this process.

Supply Disruption

Operating Cost Increase

In 2003, following the
detection of a single case
of mad cow disease on a
farm in northern Alberta,
international
customers
stopped buying Canadian
beef (Statistics Canada,
2009).

In 2015, after a shipment
from India was found to
contain a foreign insect,
Vietnam stopped importing
peanuts from India (VBN,
2015). The failure of an
importer to control its
shipments disrupted supply
to all other importers.

Following the recall of
Tylenol painkillers in 1982,
the FDA tightened packaging
regulations,
causing
the
pharmaceutical industry to
lose a total of $8.68 billion
(Dowdell et al., 1992).

In 2011, following an
accident in a Fukushima
nuclear
power
plant
designed by GE, Germany
and Switzerland decided to
phase out nuclear power
entirely, and Italy decided
to abandon plans to build
new
nuclear
plants
(Kagramanyan,
2012).
GE’s
design
failure
affected the demand for
other
technology
providers.

Following the crash of two
American Airline flights into
World Trade Center towers
on September 11, 2001, the
private insurance market
stopped providing insurance
coverage
for
airlines
(Kunreuther and MichelKerjan, 2004).
American Airline’s security
failure affected the insurance
coverage of other airlines.

In 2010, a fire on an oil rig
chartered by BP caused
insurance premiums for deep
water oil exploration to
increase (Kollewe, 2010).

Following the death of
more than 1,000 garment
workers in the collapse of
the Rana-Plaza building
which housed a number of
separate garment factories,
Disney stopped buying
from
its
Bangladeshi
manufacturers,
although
none of them were
associated with the event
(Greenhouse, 2014).

The supply of live cattle to
Indonesian slaughterhouses
was suspended after the
Australian
government
banned live cattle exports to
Indonesia because of the
mistreatment of animals at
some
slaughterhouses
(Minister for Agriculture,
2011). One slaughterhouse’s
behavior affected the supply
of live cattle to other
slaughterhouses.

After the spill of about 5
million barrels of oil into the
Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the
U.S. government tightened
offshore
oil
and
gas
regulations,
costing
the
industry hundreds of millions
of dollars (Enerknol Research,
2015).

Social/ Environmental
Events

Demand Disruption

Product-Harm
Events

Form of Contagion Manifestation

Operating
Events

Triggering
Event Type

Table 1-1: Types of contagion

5

Contagion risk assessment involves developing mathematical methods for formulating
probability distribution or evaluating the risk of contagion. In contagion measurement, the
focus is on evaluating the impact of certain events happening in certain industries. The aim
of studies in this area is to identify the events that can cause contagion in the future.
Finally, contagion risk management strategies is about studying and developing different
plans and policies that can either mitigate the probability or control the consequences of
contagion.
The following section briefly explains how each chapter of the dissertation contributes
to the four areas.

Figure 1-3: Areas of contagion management risk field

1.2. Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. This section explains how chapters
two to five construct the dissertation.
Chapter 2 aims to build the theoretical foundations needed for chapters three and four
and hence contributes to the first area of the field of contagion risk management (Figure 16

3). Using theories and examples of contagion in different industries, this chapter identifies
the elements involved in the contagion process and the key attributes of each element. The
chapter provides a brief history of contagion, defines contagion risk, and conceptualizes the
contagion process and the relationship between factors contributing to the process, while
focusing on the role of stakeholder as the agent of risk. The chapter also explains how a
failure of a rival in the industry can cause a firm’s stakeholders to react adversely to the
firm.
Chapter 3 is founded on the propositions of Chapter 2. The chapter provides empirical
evidence on "sectoral contagion" and its relationship to the size of primary effect (impact
on the liable rival) and severity of a triggering event as well as its signal value (the factor
that causes perceived and actual risks of an event to be different). The study fits into the
first type of contagion (see Table 1-1), where the type of event is product-harm and
contagion is manifest in the form of demand disruption or reduction. The chapter evidences
the role of signal value and introduces a method for operationalizing the construct. The
result shows that contagion can occur, even when events are not extreme. Given its results,
the chapter contributes to the second and third areas of the field.
Chapter 4 is about contagion risk management and fits into the fourth area of the field.
The chapter uses the theoretical model of the contagion process discussed in Chapter 1 and
employs economic modeling to find the condition under which investing in the safety of a
rival could be profitable. The chapter highlights the difference between actual safety and
perceived safety and formulates their relationship.
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the dissertation’s contributions and implications in light of
extant research and discusses opportunities for future research. While inter-related,

7

chapters two to four can be read in any order, and readers can consider them as three
independent academic essays. Each of the three chapters include an introduction and
implications of the research questions, an overview of the related literature, methodology,
results, and conclusions. Each chapter’s complete findings are below.

8

Chapter 2. Dynamics of Contagion Risk
Abstract
Contagion can cause significant loss to non-liable firms. This is a critical issue, especially
for firms that over-comply with safety regulations, because they could be penalized for
risks that they have already directly addressed, while other firms have not taken
appropriate action. Contagion is a serious threat because it can happen even when the
triggering event is not severe, or when the liable rival is small. With the goal of enabling
low-risk firms to assess and manage contagion risk, I use real cases to conceptualize the
contagion process and apply related theories and literature to theorize key factors
contributing to contagion risk. I theorize that "stakeholder identity" plays a central role in
the emergence of contagion risk.
Keywords: Contagion Risk, Stakeholder Identity, Supply Chain Risk Management,

2.1. Introduction
As mentioned in the first chapter, sometimes one firm’s failure can adversely affect an
entire industry. This effect, referred to as "contagion", is a well-recognized concept,
especially in the area of financial economics. My search of the term "contagion" in the
peer-reviewed financial economic journals returned more than 1,500 results. Contagion has
also been studied in marketing in terms of the market reaction to an entire industry
following a product recall announcement. A classic example is the Chicago Tylenol
murders, where drug tampering in the Chicago metropolitan area in 1982 resulted in a
series of deaths. Dowdell and his co-authors (1992) found that major firms in the

9

pharmaceutical industry lost a total of $8.68 billion after the Tylenol recall in 1982. This
demonstrates how severe the contagion effect can be. However, what makes contagion an
important risk is that it can be triggered by a small event happening to a small firm. For
instance, the Canadian mad cow crisis, which cost the Canadian beef industry $7 billion,
was initiated by the detection of a single case of mad cow disease that had not even entered
the consumption chain. As mentioned in Chapter 1, contagion can manifest itself through
demand disruption, supply disruption, or operating cost increases. This implies that
contagion risk is a type of supply chain risk, which is caused by rivals. Most of the studies
in the area of supply chain management have researched the risks associated either with
buyers or suppliers, but to my best knowledge, no study has explored the supply chain risks
posed by rivals. This paper attempts to fill this gap by answering the following research
questions: (a) How do some adverse consequences spread from a rival to other firms in the
same market or industry? (b) What factors contribute to this process? (c) Why do some
events have a contagion effect, while others do not? And finally, (d) Why are some
industries more susceptible to contagion than others?

Figure 2-1: Sequence of conceptualizing the relationships between the attributes

10

To answer these questions, I use existing literature and theories in decision-making,
cognitive psychology, and risk management fields, along with supporting examples of
adverse events in different supply chains to theorize the key elements involved in the
contagion process, the main attributes of the elements, and the relationships between the
attributes and contagion (See Figure 1-4).
The chapter sheds new light on the nature of contagion risk by exploring it from a
decision-making view, highlighting the role of stakeholders as the agents of risk, and
conceptualizing and integrating various types of contagion into a single process model. The
next section further discusses the concept and the properties of contagion.

2.2. Contagion process
Based on the cases of events I reviewed, at least four key elements are involved in a
contagion process (Figure 2-1): (a) triggering event, (b) liable rival, (c) focal firm facing
contagion risk, and (d) stakeholder(s) of the focal firm. Stakeholders act as the agents of
contagion risk. Therefore, the stakeholder is the center of analysis in this study. Although
firms usually have multiple stakeholders, I explore the decision-making process of a single
stakeholder to avoid unnecessary complexity. A stakeholder is “any group or individual
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives” (Takeuchi, 2010).
Since organizations fundamentally rely on individuals to undertake activities, such as
analyzing, assessing, and reacting to risks on its behalf, I use individual-level cognitive
theories of risk behavior to theorize the factors contributing to a stakeholder’s judgment of
risk and decision. As it is cumbersome to simultaneously deal with the individual and

11

corporate meanings of stakeholder, I consider stakeholders as either a group of individuals
having one or more characteristics in common (e.g., consumers), or as an organization.
When news spreads about a rival firm’s adverse event , stakeholders of every other
firm in the industry (re-)evaluate the probability that similar events will occur at their firm.
If the re-evaluated risk exceeds an acceptable level, the stakeholder may decide, or be
forced by its constituents (the entities that have a legitimate interest in the stakeholder), to
modify its relationship with the firm to address their own risk. The modification of the
relationship can range from minor changes, such as adding clauses to a contract or
decreasing the frequency and size of transactions, to the termination of the relationship.

Figure 2-2: Elements involved in the contagion process

A fundamental concept in my study is "risk judgement". Risk judgment could either be
objective (actual) or subjective (perceived) (Rowe and Wright, 2001). This
dichotomization arose from the observation that experts and laypeople often disagree about
the risk level associated with different events (Taylor et al., 2014). An expert is defined as
a person with a background in the subject area who is recognized by others as an expert in
that area (Skjong and Wentworth, 2001). While objective risks are based on "expert
judgments" or "assessments", subjective risks (the degree of uncertainty perceived by
individuals) are derived from "lay judgments" or "perceptions". Objective definitions of
12

risk see it as a statistical expectation value of outcome severity. On the other hand,
subjective risk is based on “people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgments and feelings, as well as
the wider social or cultural values and dispositions that people adopt towards hazards and
their benefits” (Pidgeon et al., 1992). Brun (1994) argues that, similar to objective risk,
subjective definitions of risk tend to include event severity and uncertainty dimensions, but
Slovic (1997) suggests that even if these were the only two dimensions included in lay
perceptions, lay risk perception would still differ from expert risk assessments due to
heuristics and bias that influence such quantitative estimates.
Risk perception involves collecting, selecting, and interpreting signals about uncertain
impacts of events, activities, or technologies (Wachinger et al., 2013). These signals can
refer to either direct observation or information obtained from others. Perceived risk varies
depending on the type of risk, the risk context, the personality of the individual, and the
social context, and is influenced by knowledge, experience, values, attitudes, and feelings
(Wachinger et al., 2010).
In this research, an objective judgment process is used to evaluate contagion risk.
However, stakeholders evaluate their risks through a process that involves a combination
of objective and subjective judgments, depending on the stakeholder’s identity.
Given the elements involved in the contagion process, I theorize the factors
contributing to contagion risk and propose a framework illustrated in Figure 2-1.

2.2.1.

Theoretical framework

As previously mentioned, a firm’s contagion risk refers to the probability of an adverse
reaction of the firm’s stakeholder(s) pertaining to a specific triggering event. By definition,
contagion risk is described and measured in association with a certain event or an event
13

type. An adverse event in the industry can stimulate the stakeholder’s concern about the
occurrence of similar events to the focal firm and drive it to react if the stakeholder
concludes that the firm is unable to manage the new state of risk. This suggests that
contagion risk has a direct relationship to the change in the stakeholder’s judgment of the
focal firm’s risk, which, in turn, derives from the change of the stakeholder’s judgments
on:
a) the seriousness of the event,
b) the extent to which the focal firm is prone to similar events, and
c) the ability of the focal firm to manage risk.
An expert stakeholder’s judgment of the firm’s risk does not change through a single
event, unless the event’s severity exceeds an estimated maximum threshold (informative
contagion). However, a lay stakeholder’s judgment can be influenced, even if the event is
not actually severe (naive contagion). The difference lies in their dissimilar approaches
(subjective vs. objective) to risk evaluation. A subjective approach to causes a nonfrequent event to be perceived as unlikely before it happens and very likely after it. A
subjective approach can also cause a firm’s exposure to a given event to be overestimated
when it is built on superficial similarities between the firm and its rival which has recently
been affected by an event. When these distorted judgments are combined with the
underestimation of the firm’s risk-management capability, they can lead to a severe
reaction of the lay stakeholders to the firm. This difference between lay and expert
approaches to risk judgment supports the theory that firms are at higher risk of contagion
when their stakeholders decide like laypeople. Therefore, this paper explores "naive

14

contagion" and the process and factors that contribute to the misjudgment of risk by lay
stakeholders (Figure 2-2).

Figure 2-3: Factors contributing to contagion risk
The key attributes of the four elements of contagion, namely event, liable rival, focal
firm, and the focal firm’s stakeholder, impact a lay stakeholder’s judgment of risk. These
attributes include (i) signal value (attribute of event), (ii) similarities to the focal firm
(attribute of liable rival), (iii) stakeholders’ trust (attribute of focal firm), and (iv) identity
and power (stakeholder attributes).

2.2.2.

Signal value of event

Early theories linked social risk judgments and responses to event severity measured by
deaths and casualties and/or cost of damages; however, events such as the Three Mile
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Island nuclear accident in 1979 and the mad cow crises in Canada and the U.S. in 2003,
which had no fatalities but caused huge social impacts, demonstrate that a property other
than "severity" also contributes to the public’s perception of the event’s seriousness. This
property is referred to as "signal value", the degree to which an event increases one's
perception of the risk of similar or more destructive events in the future (Slovic, 1987). The
process by which risks are intensified by lay stakeholders is explained by the Social
Amplification of Risk Framework (Kasperson et al., 1988). According to the framework, a
triggering event interacts with psychological, social, and cultural processes in ways that
can intensify lay individuals’ perceptions of risk and related risk behavior (Kasperson et
al., 2005). The signal value of an event is closely related to its perceived lack of control,
catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and
benefits, as well as the extent to which its manifestation of harm is unobservable,
unknown, new, and delayed in its manifestation of harm (Slovic et al., 1987). Given this
explanation, we expect an event such as a train wreck with high fatalities to cause
relatively little social disturbance because it occurs as part of a familiar and wellunderstood system. However, a small event, such as a minor accident with a nuclear
reactor, is expected to cause great public concern, as the accident is interpreted to mean
that its risk is not well understood, not controllable, or not competently managed. Given
the above discussion, I propose the following:

Proposition 1: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the signal value of an
event, the more likely it is that the event will change stakeholders’ judgment of risk.
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2.2.3.

Similarities between the liable rival and the firm

By definition, lay individuals tend to use heuristics to deal with the full complexity and
multitude of risks. Heuristics are simplified mechanisms and mental shortcuts used to
evaluate risk and shape responses (Kahneman et al., 1982). One heuristic is the "similarity
heuristic", which pertains to how people make judgments based on the similarity between
current situations and other situations or situation prototypes. The goal of the similarity
heuristic is to maximize productivity through a favorable experience while not repeating an
unfavorable experience. This explains why lay individuals tend to use their past experience
to shape their world view and incorporate them in their current experiences. Heuristics
work well in most conditions; however, they can lead to systematic deviations from logic,
probability, or rational choice theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1985). The resulting errors
are referred as "cognitive biases", of which many different types have been documented.
Cognitive biases resulting from similarity heuristics include ignoring prior probabilities,
assuming that similarity in one aspect leads to similarity in other aspects, and assuming
that a small sample is representative of a much larger population (Tversky and Kahneman,
1982). A typical example of these biases is when consumers overestimate the extent that a
firm superficially similar to an unsafe rival is prone to the same event that hit the rival,
even though the firm is from a population containing relatively safe firms. The similarity of
a firm to its rival can lie in its product, process, technology, supply chain, or origin. For
instance, in their studies on automobile recalls, Crafton et al. (1981) and Reilly and Hoffer
(1983) showed that industry rivals that produce similar lines of cars suffer declines in sales
following serious automobile recalls. As another example, a survey conducted on Toyota's
accelerator pedal problems in 2009 showed that the public connected other Asian
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automakers, including Honda, Hyundai, and Nissan, with the problems (Faktenkontor,
2009). In explanation of this finding, an expert argues that in customers' minds, Toyota
ranked highest in quality among Asian carmakers, leading them to conclude that other
manufacturers with the same origin (Asia) would have even more problems with quality
(Automotive News, 2010). I propose the following:

Proposition 2: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the similarities between
the firm and the liable rival, the more likely it is that an event will change stakeholders’
judgment of risk.

2.2.4.

Trust in the firm

Almost all types of social relationships, including risk management, rely on trust. In fact,
most of the argument in risk management has been related to the existing distrust between
the public (lay individuals), industry, and risk management professionals (e.g., Slovic,
1993, Slovic et al., 1991). In order to understand the role of trust, it is helpful to compare
the risks lay stakeholders fear and those they do not. Slovic (1990) found that people
perceive less risk from medical technologies, which are based on the use of radiation and
chemicals (i.e., x-rays and prescription drugs), than industrial technologies involving
radiation and chemicals (i.e., nuclear power, pesticides, and industrial chemicals).
Although x-rays and prescription drugs pose significant risks, people’s relatively high
degree of trust in the physicians who manage these devices makes them appear safer. In
contrast, numerous polls have demonstrated that government and industry officials who
manage nuclear power and nonmedical chemicals are not highly trusted (Cvetkovich,
2013).
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Keh and Xie (2008) found that in times of crisis, high levels of trust have the power to
increase confidence and decrease perceived danger. Similarly, situational crisis
communication theory posits that a history of crises can negatively influence the reputation
of and trust in the firm and shape consumers’ perceptions of future crises (Coombs and
Holladay, 2001, 2002). Seo et al. (2014) found that following the E-Coli outbreak in its
restaurants in 2003, Jack in the Box’s stock prices showed significantly negative responses
to other firms’ food crises that occurred from 2004 to 2010.
The role of trust in risk perception may also explain why domestic beef consumption
did not decline after the announcement of a single case of mad cow disease in Alberta in
2003 caused international customers to ban Canadian beef; in fact, it increased by more
than five per cent (Statistics Canada, 2004). While this could have been related to the drop
in domestic beef prices due to the plunge in international demand, consumers would not
have risked consuming contaminated beef without having trust in beef suppliers. I propose
the following:

Proposition 3: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the stakeholder’s trust in
the focal firm, the less likely it is that an event will change their judgment of risk.

2.2.5.

Stakeholder’s identity

A stakeholder is a body of lay and expert individuals who evaluate risks and make
decisions. As discussed, experts use statistical data, such as annual fatalities, in their
assessments of an adverse event’s severity, whereas laypeople rely on heuristics and
qualitative risk characteristics. These differing methods often result in laypeople assigning
relatively little weight to risk assessments conducted by technical experts or government
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officials (Covello et al., 1987), leading to an overestimation of the severity of a feared
event. In reality, experts are prone to many of the same biases and heuristics as those of the
general public, especially when they are forced to go beyond the limits of available data
and rely on intuition and extrapolation (Kahnemann et al., 1982, Henrion and Fischhoff,
1986). However, they are less likely to make mistakes as a result of these biases, because
they employ calculative modes of reasoning (as opposed to intuitive reasoning) more
frequently to analyze risks (Ropeik, 2009; Sunstein, 2003). As the percentage of expert
decision-makers relative to the total decision-makers in a group of individual stakeholders
or in an organization (non-individual stakeholder) varies from zero to one hundred, the
"identity" of a stakeholder can vary along a spectrum from "absolute-lay" to "absoluteexpert" (Figure 2-4).

Figure 2-4: Spectrum of stakeholder identity

I define the "identity of a stakeholder" as the extent to which a stakeholder relies on the
judgment of experts, as opposed to laypeople, to evaluate risk and make a decision. The
closer the identity of the stakeholder is to absolute-expert, the more the stakeholder will
rely on statistical data, while the closer they are to absolute-lay, the more they will rely on
qualitative characteristics. As illustrated in Figure 2-2, "signal value of the event",
"similarity between the firm and the liable rival", and "trust in the firm" are three main
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factors that influence absolute-lay stakeholders and can drive them to overestimate the
firm’s risk. This means that the risk of contagion diminishes as the identity of the
stakeholder approaches to absolute-expert.
Thirumalai and Sinha (2011)’s study explored the financial consequences of product
recalls in the medical device industry and showed that the market penalties for medical
device recalls are not significant. This finding is interesting when compared to the market
reaction to recall announcements in other industries, such as food (Thomsen and
McKenzie, 2001) and automotive (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Bromiley and Marcus,
1989), where the market’s recall penalties are significant. Hospitals and physicians
(medical experts) make up a large part of the medical device customer group and are often
in direct consultation with device manufacturers (technical experts) in making purchase
decisions. Decision making across this group is strongly influenced by the policies of
private insurance providers and Medicare/Medicaid, which are also bodies of experts. I
argue that the previously mentioned difference in market reaction to medical device recalls
is derived from the fact that the identity of the stakeholders involved in purchasing
decisions in the medical device industry is closer to absolute-expert than other industries,
such as food and automotive, where stakeholders are mainly groups of lay individuals,
such as retail consumers. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 4: Stakeholder identity moderates the relationship between the change in
stakeholders’ judgment of risk and signal value of event, similarities between firm and
liable rival, and stakeholders’ trust in the firm.
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For organizational (non-individual) stakeholders such as suppliers, distributors, or
governments, identity is also influenced by the collective identity of constituents. Similar
to stakeholders, the identity of constituents varies along a spectrum with two extremes of
absolute-expert and absolute-lay. Fearful constituents within or outside the value system
can put pressure on the stakeholder and influence its judgment of risk. For example, in the
Tazreen fire disaster in 2012, a fire broke out in the Tazreen Fashion factory in Dhaka,
Bangladesh. At least 117 people died in the fire and over 200 were injured, placing buyers,
such as Disney, under intense pressure from consumers at home to address poor workplace
safety in Bangladesh. As a result, Disney decided to withdraw operations from Bangladesh
(Palmeri and Rupp, 2013). Tazreen was not an authorized supplier for Disney-branded
products – neither for independent licensees producing their own product, nor for product
sold by Disney through its own retail operations. In fact, what forced Disney to terminate
its relationship with suppliers in Bangladesh was pressure from consumers and society
(constituents) who perceived a high risk of non-compliance and negative social behavior.
Disaster literature indicates that some industries engage in more mitigation and
preparedness than others. For instance, Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) found that
businesses in the finance, insurance, and real estate industries do more to prepare for
disasters than businesses in other industries. Similarly, Drabek (1991, 1995) found that
lodging businesses have more extensive disaster evacuation plans than businesses in the
food service, entertainment, and travel industries. A plausible explanation could be that
prepared industries are more sensitive to risk, and therefore involve more experts in their
risk management decisions than other industries. If this is true, stakeholders from risksensitive industries are expected to have an identity closer to absolute-expert than
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stakeholders from industries that are less risk-sensitive. Larger stakeholders have more
resources available to hire experts. A higher number of hired experts approximates the
identity of a stakeholder to absolute-expert; however, the number of lay constituents
generally increases as the size of the stakeholder group grows. Given these two opposite
effects, the impact of a stakeholder group’s size on its identity is indefinite.

2.2.6.

Power of stakeholder

Stakeholders need power to enforce desired changes in their relationship with the firm.
There are many different ways of categorizing power as a construct in business research.
However, from the source-of-power perspective, power can be classified into six types:
reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, expert power, and
informational power (French et al., 1959). The source of power is not mutually exclusive,
and a stakeholder and firm may possess more than one power type.
The extent to which a stakeholder can exert its power depends, not only on its own
power, but on the power of the firm. Government and regulatory bodies are generally
powerful stakeholders; however, their power is weakened when they depend on an industry
for information (information power), or when an industry has strong economic bargaining
power (coercive power). This was the case in the Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak. The
meat industry in the U.S. is a powerful political force, both in the legislative and regulatory
arenas, and most of the companies involved in the meat business are represented by one or
more of the powerful meat trade and lobbying organizations. In 1995, the United States
Department of Agriculture proposed implementing new food safety regulations in response
to the Jack in the Box E. Coli outbreak that made hundreds of people sick. As discussed,
new regulations can cause contagion by increasing operational costs of all the firms in the
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industry. The meat industry succeeded in stopping the implementation of the new
regulations, and therefore contagion, by persuading a member of the key appropriations
committee to introduce an amendment to prolong the rulemaking process (Johnson, 2015).
Power also emerges through an unequal dependence between stakeholder and firm and
could be detrimental for the weaker party (Stolte and Emerson, 1976). However, according
to Emerson (1962), an increase in dependence asymmetry could be coupled with a
simultaneous increase in the sum of partners’ dependencies on each other, which is referred
to as "joint dependence”. Joint dependence can influence the stakeholder’s power derived
from unbalanced dependency. According to embeddedness theory, higher levels of joint
dependence must increase the depth of economic interaction between partners, building a
stronger relational orientation (Uzzi, 1996, 1999). This results in more trust between
partners and decreases the risk of power exertion. Following the Tazreen Fashion factory
fire disaster in 2012, Disney decided to withdraw from Bangladesh, while other big names,
including Walmart, initiated processes to improve factory safety and worker wellbeing.
Given that, in both cases, dependence asymmetry favored retailers, the differences in the
retailers’ reactions can be partially explained by differences in the levels of joint
dependence in their relationships with garment manufacturers. This argument is supported
by the fact that Walmart’s apparel revenue was over $20 billion in 2012 (Souza, 2013),
while Disney’s total consumer product revenue was less than $4 billion (Statista, 2015).
This suggests the following proposition:
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Proposition 5: All other factors remaining unchanged, the higher the joint dependence
between stakeholder and firm, the less likely it is that a stakeholder will modify its
relationship with a firm because of a change in its judgement of risk.

2.3. Summary and conclusion
This essay attempts to theorize the contagion process. Building on a survey of adverse
events in varying industries and a literature review, I demonstrate how a rival’s failure in
risk management can unfavorably affect other firms’ supply, demand, and operations.
Although the scope of the contagion effect in most of the cases discussed in this paper are
industry-wide or market-wide, contagion can also occur in small segments of the market or
industry. This implies that contagion may be more frequent than we think. A plausible
reason that we do not hear much about the latter type of contagion might be that public
interest is peaked only by events causing widespread contagion effect. I use relevant
literature from psychology, sociology, and management to conceptualize the process of
contagion and the contributing factors. I view contagion as a decision-making process and
propose that the entities involved in contagion are the event, the liable rival, the focal firm,
and the firm’s stakeholders. Contagion begins when an adverse event happens to a rival.
The event triggers the stakeholder to re-evaluate the risk that a similar event will happen to
the focal firm. If the evaluated risk exceeds an acceptable level, the stakeholder may
modify its relationship with the firm to address the risk.
Building on the literature about the differences between the approach of laypeople and
experts to risk judgment (assessment vs. perception) and biases embedded in risk
perception, I introduce the notion of "stakeholder identity". I contend that a stakeholder’s
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judgment on the focal firm’s risk is more likely to be realistic when it has a closer identity
to absolute-expert. Identity is based on the degree to which a stakeholder’s judgment of
risk is objective as opposed to subjective. I suggest that the closer the identity of the
stakeholder is to absolute-lay, the more its judgments and subsequent decisions will be
based on biased measures including (a) signal value of the event, (b) similarity between the
focal firm and the liable rival, and (c) trust in the focal firm’s risk management.
I also highlight the role of the stakeholder’s power in the risk of contagion. I refer to
power as the ability to enforce desired changes in the relationships for stakeholders. I argue
that the relative power of a stakeholder diminishes as the power of the firm increases, and
discuss some of the conditions in which this may happen. For example, the approach to
regulating the industry can affect the power of government and regulatory authorities.
When an industry is self-regulated and has bargaining power, there is a greater chance that
the industry can block or postpone legislation processes, thereby limiting the risk of
contagion. Dependence asymmetry in favor of a business partner, as a stakeholder,
increases stakeholders’ power, but joint dependence (the sum of partners’ dependencies on
each other) diminishes it. Therefore, the risk of contagion is higher when the joint
dependency is weaker.
A focal firm can estimate the potential signal value of a certain event from its position
on the "Dread risk – Unknown risk" factor space to estimate the risk of contagion. The
chance that the focal firm will resemble a liable rival can be measured by the industry’s
commoditization level. The trust of the stakeholder in the focal firm’s risk management
competence and power balance between the stakeholder and the focal firm can be assessed
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from the history of their interactions. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, how to
measure the identity of a stakeholder is an important and interesting research question.
I discussed two reactive and two proactive strategies to manage contagion risk. I
explained how lobbying and publicizing can address the threat of tighter regulations and
supply or demand disruption. I also discussed how self-regulating and investment in the
safety of high-risk rivals can prevent the probability of contagion.
In summary, I have identified a new research direction that can generate novel research
questions on risk management in supply chain management. Specifically, I introduce the
notions of contagion risk and “stakeholder identity”, conceptualize the factors influencing
contagion risk, highlight the underlying role of stakeholder as the agent of contagion risk,
and classify contagion risk according to the type of triggering event and form of contagion
manifestation (see Table 1-1). On the practical side, my findings help risk managers design
more effective risk management strategies in supply chain by integrating the risks that are
imposed by rivals. The results derived from my research has important implications for
supply chain and operations management scholarship, in that it explores contagion risk in
the context of decision making processes, highlights the role of stakeholders as agents of
risk, and conceptualizes and integrates various types of contagion into a single process
model.
A limitation of my research is that it is multi-layered and multi-theoretic and draws
theories from multiple disciplines, making it challenging for the audience. I understand that
going deeper into the various propositions in separate papers would help to address it;
however, this is not possible before integrating the concepts, supporting theories,
information, and terminology in one piece to build the foundations needed for further
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research. Contagion, as a whole, is a coherent concept and its components are best
understood in context and in relation to one another.
Testing these theories using empirical methods is a natural direction for the future
extension of this research. This can be done separately for each of nine different types of
contagion risk discussed above. The main challenge in this direction is operationalizing the
construct of “stakeholder identity”. The other direction for future research is to measure
contagion risk. This involves a combination of analytical and empirical approaches to
formulate and test the risk. The result of the research can then be used to develop an
insurance policy for contagion risk.
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Chapter 3. Empirical Evidence on Contagion
Abstract
This study is an early work attempting to measure the impact of contagion by using
product recalls in two very different industries (meat and toy). The study examines small
to moderate events as opposed to extreme events, such as an explosion in a nuclear power
plant, where contagion is clearly evident and documented. The focus on testing using
samples from small to moderate recall events seems to have been lost somehow. The study
explores the conditions under which a non-extreme event can trigger contagion. I find that
"signal value" - the non-severity factor of an event, injury counts, recall size, and the size
of the recalling firm can contribute to the level of contagion.
Keywords: Contagion Risk, Event Study, Product Recall, Signal Value

3.1. Introduction
Most of the documented cases of contagion in the world were triggered by extreme events;
however, there are cases where the triggering events were not actually severe. For instance,
when one of the Three Mile Island reactors partially melted on March 28, 1979, its small
radioactive releases had no detectable health effects on the plant workers or the public.
However, the accident turned the public against nuclear power, causing the nuclear
industry to grind to a halt. Another example is the mad cow disease in 2003 in Canada
where a single contaminated cow that never entered the food stream cost the live cattle and
beef industry approximately $7B.
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These observations pose the question of whether non-extreme events can also initiate
contagion. This is an important research question because the result will indicate how
frequent contagion is, and whether contagion risk should be included in the supply chain
risk management strategy of every firm. To answer this question, I consider product safety
recalls in the meat and toy industries. In my study, I hypothesize and test the relationships
between the sectoral contagion8 effect and the key attributes of the industry, recalling firm,
and recall.
A product recall is a request to return a product after the discovery of safety issues or
product defects that might endanger customers or put the maker/seller at risk of legal
action. The rate of product recalls continues to expand mostly because of more powerful
testing methods and tighter regulations (Anon, 2016). Several significant recalls occurred
during the 2016 calendar year, affecting the marketplace across all product categories from
dairy and poultry to clothing and automotive parts. The reason for choosing a product
recall is two-fold. First, product recalls are not generally catastrophic; second, they are
quite common when measured on the industry basis, although they rarely happen to a
single firm.
To measure the contagion effect, I use the "event study" methodology to capture the
abnormal returns9 of the firms producing products similar to the recalled product around
the recall announcement date. Some studies in the marketing and economics literature have

8

Sectoral contagion is a type of contagion that affects a specific sector of the economy limited to a particular
industry (e.g., the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979), geographical region (e.g., Toyota’s
acceleration pedal problem in 2009), or market (e.g., the U.S. mad cow crisis in 2003) as opposed to "global
contagion" which influences an entire economy.
9

Abnormal return is the difference between the actual change in stock price and a benchmark to adjust for
the overall industry and market-wide influences.
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examined the "secondary effect".10 However, the issue with these studies is that their
results are mixed and sometimes contradicting. For instance, Hoffer et al. (1988) show that
contagion is not statistically significant in the automotive industry. Dranove & Olsen
(1984) find that the recalls of five dangerous drugs negatively affected competitors, while
Ahmed et al. (2002) conclude that direct competitors see significant gains following drug
withdrawals. Similarly, Govindaraj et al. (2004) find that competitors experienced a
significant gain in market value following a recall by Bridgestone Corporation.
Unfortunately, none of these studies discuss the factors that might have contributed to their
findings. This is an important limitation, as testing the impact of an event without
controlling for the covariates generally leads to erroneous statistical significance and false
inference. For example, firms offering diverse substitute products could remain unaffected
following a product recall made by a rival, while those selling only products similar to the
recalled product may be affected significantly. Ignoring the impact of product diversity can
create either type I or type II errors, depending on the sample structure. To address this
limitation, I test the contagion effect of recall announcements in this study while
controlling for several factors including event type, event size, and the type and size of the
recalling firm. The study proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the hypotheses
examined. Section 3 describes the collection of the sample data. The basics of the event
study methodology are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents and interprets the result
of the event studies and analyzes how the shareholder value loss associated with recalls is
moderated by various factors. Section 6 discusses the implications of my results on dealing
with recalls. The final section summarizes the paper.
10

The contagion effect can also be called the "secondary effect" as opposed to the "primary effect" which
refers to the impact of a recall on the recalling firm.
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3.2. Issues and hypotheses examined
Based on the results of the second chapter, I hypothesize the impact of the key attributes of
recall, recalling firm, and industry on the magnitude of the secondary effect (contagion
effect).
A product safety recall can stimulate customers’ concerns about the safety of similar
products in the market and drive them to stop buying related products, not only from the
recalling firm, but also from other firms in the same market or industry. This behavior can
be explained by the "availability heuristic" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). People often use
heuristics to reduce complex problem solving to more simple judgmental operations. These
rules work well under most circumstances, but they can lead to systematic deviations from
logic, probability, or rational choice theory (Gigerenzer, 1991). The "availability heuristic"
is a type of heuristic that relies on immediate examples that come to mind when evaluating
risks. It operates on the notion that events that can be more easily brought to mind or
imagined are judged to be more likely than events that could not easily be imagined. This
cognitive bias generally increases for negative events, as people apply more weight to
negative instances than positive ones when making a judgment. In a survey conducted in
2012 on the performance of S&P 500 Index in 2009, 2010, and 2011, a majority of
respondents felt as though the market was either flat or down in 2009, and roughly half
said the same about 2010 and 2011 (Franklin Templeton Investments, 2012). In reality, the
S&P 500 saw double digit gains in 2009 and 2010, and a modest gain in 2011. This is
consistent with other results, in that more painful, negative events that can be recalled (e.g.,
the 2009 economic crisis) often have a larger influence than positive events when making
judgments (Davis, 2017). When a product safety recall occurs, the recall triggers
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recollections of past recalls, especially the worst ones, because they are easier to
remember, or in other words, more available. This phenomenon is evidenced by Seo et al.
(2014). For example, in early 1993, more than 700 people became sick and four children
died because of the E. coli outbreak in Jack in the Box restaurants, which proved to be one
of the most significant food poisoning outbreaks in U.S. history. Seo and his co-authors
found that Jack in the Box’s stock prices exhibited significantly negative responses to other
firms’ food crises that occurred from 1994 to 2010, especially when the crisis was closer in
time and similar in nature.
Based on the above discussion, I posit that a product recall will negatively influence
customers’ purchasing decisions for similar products. This reaction shifts the demand curve
until customers’ trust is regained. The more severe the initiating recall event, the larger the
shift will be. A loss of sales and the cost of regaining customers’ trust can drive investors
to value affected firms in an industry at a discount compared to similar firms in other
industries. The fear of tighter regulation and increases in operating costs across the industry
as a result of the recall can intensify negative reactions of investors. My first hypothesis is:

H1a. A product recall negatively affects the market value of all firms selling products
similar to the recalled product (the secondary effect).
H1b. The secondary effect is larger when the primary effect is more negative.

Hypotheses H1 is about the overall stock market reaction to product recall
announcements. However, it is also of interest to identify factors that could influence the
direction and magnitude of the market reaction. The factors influencing the contagion
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effect can be classified into three groups: 1) factors related to the initiating event of recall,
2) factors related to the recalling firm, and 3) factors related to the industry.
An important event related factor is severity. Two dimensions of severity are "injury
count" and "recall size". When there is a large product recall, more publicity is needed to
inform all customers. Publicity not only alerts those who have already bought the product,
but also potential buyers of similar products. As discussed, bad news distorts the risk
perceived by individuals because of the "availability heuristic". This means that more
publicity will discourage more potential buyers from buying. On the other hand, larger
product recalls indicate that more customers are at risk, especially when the injury count is
high; therefore, it is more likely that the government will react by enforcing more stringent
regulations. Thus, my hypotheses on event severity are:

H2a. The secondary effect will be more negative when the recall size is larger.
H2b. The secondary effect will be more negative when the injury count is higher.

The other event-related factor is the "signal value", the factor that causes the perceived
severity of an event to be different from its actual severity. My third hypothesis is that the
stock market’s reaction to the industry will be more negative when the "signal value" of the
event is higher. Early theories link social risk judgments and responses to "event severity"
measured by the number of casualties or amount of damage. However, events such as the
Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 and the mad cow crises in Canada and the U.S.
in 2003 had no fatalities but had huge social impact and demonstrate that a property other
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than the event’s "severity" contributes to the public’s perception of the event’s seriousness.
This property is referred to as the "signal value".
The signal value of an event, and thus its potential social impact, appears to be
systematically related to the risk profile of the event. An accident that takes many lives
may produce relatively little social disturbance (beyond that caused to the victims’ families
and friends) if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system (e.g., a train
wreck). However, a small incident in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived as poorly
understood), such as a nuclear waste repository or a recombinant DNA laboratory, may
have immense social consequences if it is perceived as a harbinger of future and possibly
catastrophic mishaps. (Slovic and Weber, 2002)
To predict the signal value of an event, Slovic et al. (1985) developed a "Dread Risk –
Unknown Risk" factor space. The "Dread Risk" factor refers to perceived lack of control,
catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and
benefits. The "Unknown Risk" factor is the extent to which a hazard is unobservable,
unknown, new, and delayed in its manifestation of harm. Slovic (1987) demonstrated that
potential signal value is closely related to the position of an event within the factor space.
The higher an event’s score is on the Dread factor, the higher its perceived risk is (Slovik
& Weber, 2002). As for the "Unknown Risk" factor, familiarity with an event (e.g.,
acquired by daily exposure) lowers perceptions of its risk (Weber, 2006). Given the above
discussion, I hypothesize the following:

H3. The secondary effect of a recall will be more negative when the signal value of its
initiating event is larger.
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The next hypothesis is about the role of similarity in the contagion effect, which is
explained by the "representativeness heuristic" or the "similarity heuristic" (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982). The similarity heuristic explains how people make judgments based on
the similarity between current situations and other situations or prototypes of those
situations. The goal of the similarity heuristic is to maximize productivity through
favorable experiences while not repeating unfavorable experiences. This explains why
people tend to shape their world view by their past experiences and incorporate them into
their current experiences. As mentioned before, heuristics can lead to systematic deviations
from logic, probability, or rational choice theory. The resulting errors are referred to as
"cognitive biases" and many different types have been documented. The cognitive biases
resulting from a similarity heuristic include ignoring prior probabilities, assuming that
similarity in one aspect leads to similarity in other aspects, and assuming that a small
sample is representative of a much larger population. A typical situation that includes these
biases is when consumers overestimate the extent to which a firm, superficially similar to a
recalling rival, is prone to the same event that hit the rival, even though the firm is drawn
from a population containing relatively safe firms.
The similarity of a firm to its rival can lie in its product, process, technology, sector,
market, industry, supply chain, or origin. For instance, a survey conducted on Toyota's
accelerator pedal problems in 2009 showed that the public connected other Asian
automakers, including Honda, Hyundai, and Nissan, with the problems. In explanation of
this finding, an expert argued that in customers' minds, Toyota was rated as the highest in
quality among Asian carmakers, leading them to conclude that other manufacturers with
the same origin (Asia) would have even more problems with quality (Automotive News,
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2010). As another example, in their studies on automobile recalls, Crafton et al. (1981) and
Reilly & Hoffer (1983) show that industry rivals that produce similar lines of cars suffer
sales declines following serious automobile recalls.
Multidimensionality of similarity implies that firms are perceived more similar when
they look similar on more dimensions (i.e., product, industry, origin, etc.). For example,
two meat packing firms are perceived more similar as opposed to a meat packer and a
retailer selling meat products. Hence, a recall made by a meat packing company is more
likely to negatively affect other meat packing companies, as opposed to one made by a
retailer. With respect to my reasoning, I hypothesize:

H4. The secondary effect will be more negative when the recalling rival and the affected
firm are from the same sector of the industry.

3.3. Sample selection procedure and data description
The recall samples used in this study are collected from the meat and toy industries. These
two industries are selected because the literature shows that the primary impacts of recalls
for both industries are statistically significant (Chu et al., 2005; Thomsen and McKenzie,
2001)11. The recall announcements were gathered from the recall case archive of the U.S.
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) recall databases. The data was collected for the period of 1982 to
2014. All data about the firms, including return, debt, book value, SIC code, closing price,

11

According to the literature, the primary impact in the meat industry is significant only for class-I recalls.
Class-I recalls are for dangerous or defective products that predictably could cause serious health problems or
death.
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number of shares outstanding, and market return needed for evaluation of the abnormal
returns of recalling firms and industry portfolios was collected from Wharton Research
Data Services, CRSP and Compustat databases.
As reported in Table 3-1, totals of 129 meat (beef, pork and poultry) class I recalls and
162 toy recalls made by public companies or their subsidiaries were identified. A three-day
window was used for the primary event study, and recalls made by the same firm within
two days after another one were excluded.12 This correction caused the number of the
recalls to decrease to 124 meat and 156 toy recall announcements. One meat and one toy
recalls were excluded from the analysis because of missing return data near the event. In
addition, six meat recalls and eight toy recalls were excluded because the related financial
ratios needed for primary regression analysis was missing from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). Similarly, for the secondary event study, I excluded recalls made
by the same firm within two days after the first recall, leaving 117 meat and 146 toy recall
announcements. Seven meat and six toy recalls announcements were excluded from the
secondary regression analyses because of missing financial information.
To make sure that the recall dates provided by FSIS and CPSC were the earliest dates, I
used Factiva, a business information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company,
to compare the recall dates with the dates news announcements were reported by
newswires or newspapers. For meat recalls, seven announcements were not found on
Factiva, and seven additional announcements were reported up to three days earlier than
FSIS announcement dates.

12

When a dummy variable was used and the points were kept, the results remained substantially unchanged.
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Table 3-1: Description of Recall Announcements

Panel A: Sample Size and Breakdown of Firms’ Types

Initial Sample Size
Primary Event Study Sample Size
Primary Regression Analysis Sample Size
Secondary Event Study Sample Size
Secondary Regression Analysis Sample Size
Breakdown of the firms’ types
Breakdown of the events’ types

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics
Sale (000)
Max
99,137
Min
284
Meat
Average
11,435
Median
13,661
Max
74,259
Min
22
Toy
Average
3,833
Median
4,259

Meat
129
124
117
117
110
53 meat processor
34 food packers
23 retailers
51 pathogenic
59 other reasons

Market Value (000,000)
70,557
26
5,082
10,257
42,424
10
3,129
4,621

Toy
162
156
148
146
140
72 toy manufacturer & toy retailers
35 retailers
33 others
15 lead contamination
125 other reasons

Market to Book
47.74
0.19
3.68
2.75
15.02
0.41
3.17
2.99

Debt to Equity
0.97
0.17
0.44
0.43
0.93
0.05
0.33
0.29

For the toy industry, only one recall was not found on Factiva and three announcements
were reported up to one day earlier. FSIS and CPSC announcements were used when the
announcement date was earlier than news on Factiva, or when the news was not found on
Factiva. From 110 meat recalls left for the secondary regression analysis, 53 recalls were
made by meat processors, 34 recalls were made by food processors, and 23 recalls were
announced by retailers. Fifty-one announcements were made due to contamination with a
pathogen, such as E. coli, listeria, hepatitis, or salmonella, and the rest were made because
of foreign object contamination, undeclared allergens, or other reasons. From 140 toy
recalls, 72 were announced by toy manufacturers or toy retailers, 35 by retailers, and 33 by
others, such as McDonald’s. Only 15 recalls were announced because of excessive levels
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of lead, and the rest were initiated because of laceration, choking, chemical, burning
hazards, or other reasons.

3.4. Methodology
3.4.1.

Event Study

To estimate the shareholder value loss associated with recall announcements of rivals, I
used the event study methodology (see Kothari and Warner, 2006). The methodology uses
abnormal returns to provide an estimate of the percent change in stock price associated
with an event. In an efficient market, the impact of an event is immediately reflected in
stock prices, and hence a measure of the impact can be obtained by observing stock price
behavior over relatively short time periods. The key features of the event study
methodology and how to estimate the abnormal returns are briefly explained here.
Different models have been developed to estimate abnormal returns. The model I used
is the market model on daily stock price returns, as this is the best specified model and
controls for the systematic risk of the stock, a key factor in explaining stock returns. The
model suggests a linear relation between the return on a stock and the market return over a
given time period as:
rit = αi + βi rmt + εit

)1(

where rit is the return of stock i on Day t, rmt is the market return on Day t, αi is the
intercept of the relationship for stock i, βi is the slope of the relationship for stock i with the
market return, and εit is the error term for stock i on Day t. αi is an estimate of the constant
daily return for stock i, βirmt is the portion of the return for stock i that is due to marketwide movements, and the error term, εit , is the part of the return of stock i that cannot be
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explained by market movements and captures the effect of firm-specific information. For
each sample firm, I estimated 𝛼̂𝑖 , 𝛽̂𝑖 and 𝑆̂𝜖2𝑖 (the variance of the error term, εit) using
ordinary least square regression (see Eq. (1)) on data over an estimation period of 200
trading days. To ensure proper estimates of alpha and beta, a minimum of 40 return
observations in the estimation period was required to keep the announcement in the
analysis. Ait, the abnormal return for stock i on Day t, is the difference between rit, the
actual return of stock i on Day t, and (𝛼̂𝑖 + 𝛽̂𝑖 𝑟𝑚𝑡 ) the normal (or expected) return on stock
i on Day t, and is expressed as:
𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼̂𝑖 + 𝛽̂𝑖 𝑟𝑚𝑡 )

)2(

Averaging the abnormal returns across the sample firms on any Day t, the daily mean
abnormal, 𝐴̅𝑡 , can be expressed as:
𝑁

𝐴̅𝑡 = ∑
𝑖=1

𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑁

)3(

where N is the number of sample observations on Day t. The cumulative abnormal return
over a given time period (t1, . . ., t2) is the sum of the daily mean abnormal returns, 𝐴̅𝑡 , and
is expressed as:
𝑡=𝑡2

𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1 , 𝑡2 ) = ∑ 𝐴̅𝑡

)4(

𝑡=𝑡1

To test the statistical significance of the daily mean abnormal return of Eq. (3), each
abnormal return, 𝐴𝑖𝑡 , is first divided by its estimated standard deviation of error, 𝑆̂𝜀𝑖 , to
𝑆
yield a standardized abnormal return, 𝐴𝑖𝑡
:
𝑆
𝐴𝑖𝑡
=

𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆̂𝜀

)5(

𝑖

47

The test statistic, TSt , for any Day t is given by:
𝑁

𝑇𝑆𝑡 = ∑
𝑖=1

𝑆
𝐴𝑖𝑡

√𝑁

)6(

The rationale behind Eq. (6) is that under the null hypothesis, abnormal returns are
assumed to be independent across firms with mean 0 and variance 𝑆̂𝜀2𝑖 . From the central
limit theorem, the sum of N standardized independent abnormal returns is therefore
normal, with mean 0 and variance N, which leads to Eq. (6). The test over multiple days
(t1... t2) is derived similarly, with the additional assumption that abnormal returns are
independent and identically distributed across time. The multiple day test statistics, TS c, is
given by:
𝑁

𝑇𝑆𝑐 = ∑
𝑖=1

𝑡=𝑡2 ̂ 2
2
∑𝑡=𝑡
𝑡=𝑡1 𝐴𝑖𝑡 /√∑𝑡=𝑡1 𝑆𝜀𝑖

)7(

√𝑁

Consistent with most event studies, I used a three-day event period to measure the
secondary impact for each of the toy and meat industries. I made an industry portfolio
based on the Standard Industry Classification Code (SIC) of the firms. The SIC code is a
system for classifying industries by a four-digit code. The SIC codes representing meat and
toy industries are listed in Table 3-2. The number and combination of the firms in an
industry changes as new firms start or as current firms change, expand their industry or
stage in the value chain, are bought, go private, or go out of business. Therefore, the
portfolios were updated for every trading day. Only firms that were in the toy or meat
industries at a trading day were included in the industry portfolio of that day.
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Table 3-2: List of SIC codes representing meat and toy industry
Meat Industry SIC codes
2011: Meat Packing Plants
5147: Meats and Meat Products
2013: Sausages and Other Prepared Meats Products
2016: Poultry Slaughtering and Processing
5144: Poultry and Poultry Products
Toy Industry SIC codes
3942: Dolls and Stuffed Toys
3944: Games, Toys, and Children's Vehicles, except Dolls and Bicycles
5092: Toys and Hobby Goods and Supplies
5945: Hobby, Toy, and Game Shops
3940: Dolls, Toys, Games and Sporting and Athletic

The equally weighted daily returns of the industry portfolio was evaluated for each
trading day between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2014. Using an equally weighted
portfolio return prevents single large firms from overwhelming the responses of all others
in the industry. The following formula was used to compute the portfolio returns:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑡 =

∑𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑁

)8(

where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑡 denotes an equally weighted return of portfolio in day t and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 refers to
the closing price in trading day t-1 for firm i. To make sure that the abnormal return of the
portfolio would not be diluted by the abnormal return of the recalling firms, the recalling
firms were excluded from the portfolio for the dates in which they made recalls and for the
days before and after the recall dates. To prevent market crashes from inflating negative
results, I assumed that market returns and portfolio returns were undetermined for the stock
market crash dates.
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3.4.2.

Capturing signal value

As mentioned, the signal value of an event causes the perceived severity of an adverse
event to be different from its actual severity. Actual severity can be estimated by the injury
count (𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠 ) and the amount of damage (𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚 ), and perceived severity can be measured
by the number of news releases (𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠 ), which depends on both actual severity and signal
value. By orthogonalizing the measure of perceived severity against the measures of actual
severity, we have:
𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠 = 𝑘1 𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠 + 𝑘2 𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒

)9(

or
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 = 𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠 − 𝑘1 𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠 − 𝑘2 𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚

)10(

where 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are coefficients and 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 represents the part of 𝑁𝑛𝑤𝑠 that cannot be
explained by 𝑁𝐶𝑎𝑠 and 𝑁𝐷𝑎𝑚 . In my tests, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 is used to estimate signal value.

3.5. Results
Table 3-3 demonstrates the recalling firm’s daily abnormal return (primary effect) and the
industry’s daily abnormal return (secondary effect) for the meat and toy industries. The
results show that, on average, the primary and secondary effects of meat and toy recalls are
negative; however, the effects are not statistically significant, except for the primary effect
of toy recalls (equally weighted t-statistic of -2.1). The event period equally weighted mean
abnormal return of a recalling firm is -0.51% for meat recalls and -0.89% for toy recalls.
The equally weighted mean abnormal return of the industry during the event period for
both meat and toy recalls is -0.05%.
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Table 3-3: Event Study Results
Event period description
Estimation Period
Event Period
Min. required return obs.
Estimation Model
Observations
Non-clustered test results
t- test statistic
Wilcoxon z-statistic
Mean-return
Median-return
% positive
minimum return
maximum return

Primary Effect Test
Secondary Effect Test
Meat industry
Toy industry
Meat industry
Toy industry
-260 to -11
-1 to 1
40
Market Model
124
156
117
146
EW
VW
EW
VW
EW
VW
EW
VW
-1.7
-0.47
-0.0051
-0.0011
0.48
-0.30
0.12

-1.7
-0.47
-0.0051
-0.0011
0.48
-0.30
0.12

-2.1c
-2.1c
-0.0090
-0.0034
0.42
-0.21
0.10

-2.7d
-2.8d
-0.0108
-0.0056
0.43
-0.21
0.09

-0.4
-0.81
-0.0005
-0.0012
0.47
-0.06
0.14

-0.9
-0.78
-0.0012
-0.0007
0.46
-0.07
0.077

0.3
-0.27
-0.0005
0.0006
0.51
-0.08
0.07

-0.3
-0.19
-0.0015
0.0005
0.51
-0.11
0.09

Significance levels (two-tailed tests): (a) 10% level, (b) 5% level, (c) 1% level, (d) 0.5% level

Table 3-4: Primary Effect Regression Analysis Results
Meat-EW
-0.1483b

Meat-VW
-0.1500b

VIF

Toy-EW
-0.0911b

Toy-VW
-0.0959b

VIF

Size

0.0103d

0.0106d

1.187

0.0051b

0.0056c

1.974

Market to Book

-0.0004

-0.0003

1.117

-0.0001

-0.0009

1.781

Debt to Equity

0.0367

0.0365

0.0302

0.0243

Injury counts

0.0000

1.179
1.225

Intercept

0.0003

0.0002

1.718
1.169

Recall Size

-0.0028

a

-0.0031

b

1.266

-0.0004

-0.0006

1.170

Firm’s Type

-0.0019

-0.0023

1.386

-0.0017

0.0021

2.029

Signal Value

-0.0001

-0.0001

1.010

-0.0001

-0.0001

1.163

0.0000

Significance levels (two-tailed tests): (a) 10% level, (b) 5% level, (c) 1% level, (d) 0.5% level

After controlling for the size, growth prospects, capital structure, recall size, firm type
and signal value, the equally-weighted average primary abnormal returns for the meat and
the toy industries change to -14.8% (significance level of 5%) and -9.1% (significance
level of 5%), respectively (see table 3-4). Firm size and recall size are statistically
significant for the meat industry, but only the firm size is statistically significant for the toy
industry.
Firm size was measured as the natural logarithm of sales in the most recent fiscal year
that ended prior to the recall announcement date. Market-to-book, which is the proxy for
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growth potential, was measured as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value
of equity. Debt to equity, which is the proxy of capital structure, was measured by the ratio
of the book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of
equity. To compute these ratios, I used the market value of equity 10 trading days before
the recall announcement date, the book value, and the market value of the equity reported
in the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the announcement date.
To test my hypotheses I used the following model:

Sec-Abreti= 0 + 1 Prim-Abreti + 2Recall-Sizei + 3Injury-Counti + 4Signal-Valuei +
5 Firm-Typei + i

where Sec-Abreti is the event period average abnormal return of firms in the industry.
Prim-Abreti is the event period abnormal return of firm i. The predicted sign of the
coefficient 1 is positive. Recall-Sizei is the natural logarithm of the total amount recalled
or recovered. The predicted sign of the coefficient 2 is negative. Injury-Counti is the
number of recall casualties and deaths. The predicted sign of the coefficient 3 is negative.
Signal-Valuei represents the signal value of the recall items’ initiating event.
To measure the signal value of an event, I first regress the number of news releases
within seven days after the event date on primary abnormal return, severity, and firm type,
and then subtract the regressed number from the observed number of news. The predicted
sign of coefficient 5 is negative. Firm-Typei is an indicator variable that measures the type
of the recalling firm. It has a value of 1 if the recalling firm is a manufacturer in the
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industry; otherwise, it will be 0. The predicted sign of coefficient 6 is negative. Table 3-5
summarizes my predictions for the coefficients.
Table 3-5: Predicted Sign of the Coefficients
Variable
Intercept

sign
?

Primary CAR

+

Injury count

-

Recall Size

-

Firm Type

-

Signal Value

-

Table 3-6 presents the results for both the meat and toy industry. The results support
three of the five hypotheses. As predicted, the estimated coefficient of primary-effect is
positive and significant. Therefore, a firm may experience a more negative abnormal return
when the abnormal return of the recalling firm is more negative. I predicted a negative
coefficient for the injury counts. The estimated coefficient of injury-count is negative and
significant, indicating that the negative consequence of recall for the industry is more
severe when more casualties are connected to the recall. I also predicted a negative
relationship between the signal value and the secondary abnormal return. The signal value
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that negative public impression regarding
an event has a direct relationship on the severity of the secondary effect. The firm type and
recall size coefficients are negative as I predicted, but they are not statistically significant.
Therefore, the results do not support the relationship between firm type and recall size and
secondary abnormal return. Overall, the model is significant with an F value of 2.95 (pvalue of 1.5%) and an adjusted R2 of 12%, which are quite strong, given that my regression
is based on cross-sectional data.
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Table 3-6: Secondary Effect Regression Analysis Results

0.0032

MeatVW
0.0031

b

b

Meat-EW
Intercept
Primary CAR

0.1015

0.0951

VIF
EW(VW)

Toy-EW

Toy-VW

-0.0030

-0.0028

VIF
EW(VW)

1.030(1.040)

0.0383

0.0574

1.012(1.017)

Injury counts

-0.0001

b

-0.0001

b

1.164(1.164)

0.0000

0.0000

1.139(1.140)

Recall Size

-0.0005

-0.0005

1.273(1.281)

0.0001

0.0001

1.146(1.147)

Firm’s Type

-0.0011

-0.0010

1.311(1.311)

0.0035

0.0035

1.090(1.084)

b

b

1.002(1.003)
1.016(1.024)
Signal Value
-0.0002
-0.0002
0.0001
0.0001
Significance levels (two-tailed tests): (a) 10% level, (b) 5% level, (c) 1% level, (d) 0.5% level

For the toy industry, the regression analysis result does not support any of the six
hypotheses. One reason may be that, unlike meat recalls, toy recalls are not classified into
different classes, implying that my toy recall sample is diluted with less important
announcements. This argument is supported by the smaller controlled primary effect
(intercept) of toy recalls relative to meat recalls (Table 3-4). Another possible reason is the
commoditization level of the toy industry. Materials, designs, and processes used in the toy
industry are more diverse than those in the meat industry, causing consumers to perceive
relatively less similarity between products recalled and products made by other firms in the
toy industry as opposed to the meat industry. A third reason could be that, as opposed to
the meat industry where the supply chain is in-shore or mid-shore, the supply chain of the
toy industry is a mix of in-shore, mid-shore, and off-shore. This further adds to the
heterogeneity of the industry, causing it to be more difficult to detect the effect.
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3.6. Implication for managers
My findings clearly indicate that contagion can happen even when events are common;
therefore, it is necessary to assess and manage contagion risk. An obvious question for a
manager is how contagion risk can be assessed and what strategies can be adopted to avoid
or mitigate the risk of contagion.
The findings show that for the meat industry, the risk of contagion depends on the
number of casualties, the signal value of the initiating event, the size of the primary effect,
the size of the recalling firm, and the recall size. These factors can be classified into two
groups: The factors known before the event (lead factors) and those that are known after
(lag factors). The number of casualties, recall size and primary effect of the recall are
found out after the recall announcement, but the commoditization level of an industry,
average size of the firms in the industry and the signal value of the typical recall initiating
events are known beforehand. A decision maker can use the leading factors to assess the
risk of contagion. For example, a firm that is operating in a highly commoditized industry,
such as the meat industry, with many small competitors who are vulnerable to high signal
value events such as listeria, salmonella, E. coli and hepatitis, is at a high risk of contagion
because of pathogenic contamination.
The fact that larger firms have more resources to invest in safety measures implies that
those firms are generally safer than their smaller rivals. Therefore, the managers of larger
firms are reasonable to deem that their risks of contagion are higher when their industries
are dominated by small firms, especially when their stakeholders are highly sensitive to
safety issues, such as product/customer, operations/ employees, or society/environment
safety.
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Given that similarity is the key driver of contagion, managers in highly commoditized
industries should be more alert to contagion. Differentiating and/or publicizing the
differences can help managers to mitigate the fear of lay stakeholders. Transparency and
visibility of the supply chain enables a firm’s stakeholders to identify and recognize the
differences between the firm and its rivals; however, managers should be careful about the
extent of information they share with stakeholders. Some information may be
misinterpreted by stakeholders, causing them to be mislead. In addition, too much
information can confuse stakeholders and lead to an unfavourable outcome by masking key
information.

3.7. Summary and Conclusion
The main objective of this research is to provide empirical evidence on the contagion effect
of non-extreme events. To quantify the effect, I measured the average abnormal returns of
the industry following the recall announcements in the meat and toy industries. While the
result does not support the hypothesis that on average, the entire industry is adversely
affected, it evidences that the industry can be seriously impacted under certain
circumstances.
According to my findings, the average abnormal return of the industry and the impact
of the hypothesized factors on the abnormal return are statistically insignificant for the toy
industry. The average abnormal return is insignificant for the meat industry as well, but the
impact of primary-abnormal-return, signal-value, injury-count, recall size, and the size of
the recalling firm are significant at the level of 0.05.
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My findings are important because they give decision makers an idea of the potential
risks involved in having unsafe rivals and they can help decision makers assess their
contagion risks by evaluating "lead factors". Lead factors are known before an event
occurs, such as the commoditization level of the industry, average size of the firms in the
industry, and the signal value of the event.
The paper contributes to the literature by shedding light on the conditions under which
a non-severe event can cause contagion. The paper also contributes by introducing a new
methodology for capturing the signal value, a non-severity attribute of an event which
characterizes its perceived risk. Third, the findings can explain why the findings of other
research about the contagion effect are mixed.
A natural extension of this research is to test the impact of other potential contributing
factors, such as supply chain visibility, length of supply chain, the extent to which the
industry is technology intensive, market share of the recalling firm, average size of the
firms in the industry, and the size of the industry. Future research can replicate the study
for other types of events, such as operational mishaps or social responsibility accidents.
Future studies can also test the contagion effect using accounting-based performance
measures or study how long, on average, it takes for an industry to recover from contagion
and what parameters contribute to recovery time. Finally, another opportunity for future
research is to find the optimal number of days after the event for the accurate measurement
of its signal value.
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Chapter 4. Management of Contagion Risk
Abstract
Each firm faces not only its own direct risks, but also the contagion risks imposed by rivals
who, for example, avoid strong safety measures because investment cost exceeds expected
loss. The conclusion of this article is that, in an extreme case, low-risk firms may benefit
from investing in safety improvements for their higher-risk rivals. For example, a firm that
over-complies with safety requirements may benefit from investing in safety improvements
for a rival that complies with regulations at a minimal level. This research explores
conditions under which such a contagion risk mitigation strategy is profitable. My findings
indicate that, for a low-risk firm, there is a threshold above which such an investment
would be profitable. In a market where the price sensitivity to a rival’s safety is close to
zero, a low-risk firm can decrease this threshold by extending the investment horizon. The
investment is less likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as opposed to price. I
also show that, below a threshold market price, a third firm that is neutral (neither invests
nor needs investment) may be put at a cost disadvantage when this contagion risk
mitigation strategy is implemented.
Keywords: Analytics, Behavioral OR, Supply Chain Risk Management, Contagion Risk,
Safety Investment

4.1. Introduction
Research on Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) has mostly addressed threats
associated with customers (e.g., Breiter & Huchzermeier, 2015; Gümüs, 2014; Sodhi,
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2005; Treville et al., 2014) or suppliers (e.g., Chaturvedi & Martínez-de-Albéniz, 2011;
Gurnani et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2010). However, very little Supply Chain (SC) research
focuses on risks posed by rivals. In this paper, I address this gap by making use of
contagion risk and examining whether, and when, investment in rivals’ safety measures
can mitigate it.
By definition, contagion risk can be classified as an “environmental risk” from the
source-of-risk perspective and as an “industry risk” from the scope-of-impact view.
Environmental risks are defined as events driven by external forces, such as weather,
earthquakes, political, regulatory, and market forces (Wagner and Bode, 2006). Industry
risks include those that may not affect all sectors of the economy as a whole, but rather
specific industry segments (Miller, 1991). Contagion is also very similar to spillover risk
(the probability that a firm is affected because of the failure of a member of its supply
chain), but, as discussed in Chapter 2, the process of propagation in contagion is different
from spillover.
Contagion risk is well-recognized in many industries, and firms adopt various strategies
to manage it. Pharmaceuticals, for example, lobby regulators to tighten restrictions on the
import and sale of potentially unsafe drugs which could negatively affect the reputation of
the industry. Some industries, such as the nuclear power industry, practice self-regulation
to ensure compliance with minimum regulations and help prevent actual regulations from
becoming more restrictive and thus costly.
As discussed in Chapter 1, contagion is triggered by an adverse event occurring at a
rival or in its SC (Figure 1-2). A triggering event is caused by an initiating event which is
either active (evident) or dormant (hidden) and out of the rival’s control. For instance, the
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Fukushima nuclear meltdown in 2011 was caused by a tsunami, an active incident, whereas
the Toyota Sticky Gas Pedal Recall in 2009 was initiated when defective pedals were sent
to Toyota to be used on the assembly line, a dormant event. The probability of a triggering
event for a single industry may be low, but its frequency across industries is significant.
A triggering event occurs because a rival does not comply with minimum regulations
or because compliance with minimum regulations is insufficient to avoid the event. In the
latter case, one approach to address the issue is to increase the minimum requirements.
However, given that triggering events are rare, further restriction may be seen as overregulation and opposed by government or industry. An alternative approach is to encourage
complying firms to over-comply voluntarily. However, if firms perceive over-compliance
as unnecessary or threatening to their competitiveness, or if they believe that the
investment costs exceed the expected profit from the investment, they will not overcomply. This applies especially to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that lack the
operational scale to absorb an increase in cost or cannot afford the capital investment
where the return may be long term. In this context, low-risk firms who over-comply with
safety regulations may consider investing in safety improvements for high-risk rivals that
choose to comply only with regulations at a minimum level.
A valuable illustration comes from the meat industry, where I show that a firm might
voluntarily help a high-risk competitor to purchase kits to test for mad cow disease. Testing
every animal over 21 months old significantly reduces the probability that contaminated
meat can enter the food chain. In 2003, a small slaughterhouse in the state of Washington
issued a recall for about 10,000 pounds of raw beef that was suspected to be contaminated
with mad cow disease. Following the recall, 53 countries banned imports of U.S. beef,
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costing the American beef industry between $3.2B and $4.7B (Coffey et al., 2005). At the
time of the event, the U.S. had an active mad cow disease screening program in place.
Records from the Department of Agriculture show that 35,000 animals were tested
between 2001 and 2003, but none were tested at the slaughterhouse where the mad cow
case was detected (UPI, 2015), despite the slaughterhouse specializing in older and/or
injured dairy cattle, which are considered to be at a high risk for mad cow disease.
Since many forms of direct contribution to a rival may be considered “collusion” and
possibly illegal, an intermediary association is needed to collect and invest contributions.
This association can also verify if a candidate rival requires such financial contribution to
improve its safety measures and ensure that the rival follows the requirements of the
investing firm. Investment in a rival’s safety provides a non-regulatory mechanism for the
governance of contagion risk which can be combined with self-regulation. The culture of
collaboration embedded in self-regulation promotes such investments, and self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) can play the role of intermediary association. SROs are nongovernmental organizations formed by the private sector to set standards, monitor
compliance, and enforce rules. An example of a SRO is the Children's Food and Beverage
Advertising Initiative (CFBAI), which is designed to influence the advertising of foods
targeting children under 12, to encourage healthier dietary choices and lifestyles. The
CFBAI is a voluntary self-regulation program and involves 18 of the United States' largest
food and beverage companies (as of September 2013), covering approximately 80% of the
child-directed food advertising market (OECD.org, 2015).
While all firms are at risk of contagion, over-complying firms should be more
concerned as they can be penalized for risks that they have already addressed internally.
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Furthermore, it may not be a priority for firms that struggle to comply with minimum
regulatory requirements since contagion risk is a high-consequence but low-probability
risk. My research asks what factors can affect the investment decisions of a low-risk firm
and answers how variation in the contributing factors may lead to different decisions. I
apply a mathematical approach to explore the conditions under which it would be
beneficial for a low-risk firm to improve the product safety measures of a high-risk rival in
a market where firms compete on price and demand depends on both price and safety.
This paper contributes to the SC literature by introducing the notion of contagion risk,
providing a detailed model of perceived safety, bringing forward a new coopetitive
approach to risk mitigation, and addressing the variables contributing to contagion risk. On
the practical side, the research underscores the need for low-risk firms to address contagion
risk and helps them decide when to consider industry-level safety investments as an
effective strategy to manage contagion risk.
In the remainder of the paper, I briefly review the most relevant literature (Section 2),
provide a preliminary analysis to set the stage for the problem formulation (Section 3), and
propose my analytical model (section 4). Chapter 5 briefly discusses the approaches to
contagion management. I conclude by proposing directions for future research.

4.2. Literature Review
4.2.1.

Related Streams of Literature

The first relevant area of research focuses on supply risk management in decentralized
networks where self-interested interacting firms decide on investment to reduce disruption
risk. Most research in this stream (e.g., Baiman et al., 2000; Swinney & Netessine, 2009)
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explores buyer investment, for example, to enable a supplier to improve its production
processes, or to help avoid impending bankruptcy. Researchers have also explored buyer–
supplier vertical coordination of investment decisions. For instance, Bakshi & Kleindorfer
(2009) consider a bargaining game between a retailer and a supplier facing an
interdependent SC disruption risk and discuss how to share investment with SC partners to
increase SC resilience.
Another relevant stream of literature combines system reliability theory and
probabilistic risk analysis with game theory in the context of protecting a critical
infrastructure from risks, such as terrorist attacks. For example, Kim and Tomlin (2013)
and Kunreuther & Heal (2005) explore the effects of security investment decisions of one
agent on the incentives of other agents. Kunreuther & Heal propose a model of
interdependent security where agents are vulnerable to an externality from other agents.
They show that when a single successful attack can be catastrophic, the failure of one agent
to invest in security can make it unprofitable for other agents to invest. Building on this
work, Zhuang & Bier propose a new model that assumes attacks occur over time according
to a Poisson process. They find that differences in discount rates among agents can lead
some agents with low discount rates not to invest in security and conclude that
heterogeneous time preferences can complicate the task of achieving security. Their study
shows that the existence of myopic agents can make it undesirable for non-myopic agents
to invest in security, and hence they explore subsidizing strategies for such investments.
Information security research focuses on security investments and provides economic
models for both security investment and information sharing between firms. For instance,
Gal-Or & Ghose (2005) study firms’ incentives to share security information and show that

65

information sharing and security investment complement each other. Gordon & Loeb
(2002) developed an economic model to determine optimum security investments for
protecting an information set with a specific vulnerability and a given potential loss.
Finally, game theory has been applied to decide the quality choice of agents, where
demand is assumed to be dependent on both product quality and price. Related research in
this stream studies competition either under a vertical relationship (e.g., Gurnani et al.,
2006), or horizontal rivalry relationship (e.g., Banker et al., 1998; Xie et al., 2011).
Our research is similar to these four streams of research in that it applies economic
modeling to anticipate the optimal level of investment under the assumption that the
benefits from a firm’s investment depend on other firms’ decisions. My work is different
from the first stream in that it addresses risks imposed by rivals, whereas most of the
research in this stream addresses supply and demand risks. Differences in the relationships
of firms affect the nature of constraints and incentives, and hence the modeling of the
problem. In the other three streams, firms are horizontally interdependent because of either
a common source of risk or a shared market. In my analysis, firms are interdependent
because they have both a common source of risk and a shared market, causing the optimal
investment level to be constrained by investment cost as well as lost demand. However, the
most important factor that differentiates my research from the literature is my distinction
between objective safety and perceived safety. The common assumption that demand is a
function of actual safety implies that behavioural factors can be neglected. I provide a
detailed model of perceived safety and its relationship to objective safety and link these
quantities to safety investment.
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4.2.2.

Perceived Safety and Objective Safety

Safety is categorized as subjective (perceived) or objective (actual). Subjective safety is
related to psychological aspects (Stoessel, 2001) while objective safety is based on more
quantifiable measures (Suddle & Waarts, 2003). Recognizing this difference is essential in
my research because investment improves actual safety while demand is driven by
perceived safety. Studies on the relationship between perceived and objective safety are
rare in the operations management literature; however, there is considerable research on
the relationship between perceived and objective quality. Given that safety is an essential
component of a product’s quality, it is reasonable to conclude that the features and
characteristics of such a relationship in the context of quality can be extrapolated to
product safety.
Perceived quality drives preferences and subsequently sales, and it is the general
subjective assessment of quality relative to one’s own and others’ experiences of quality.
Objective quality refers to the collective performance of all product attributes (Mitra &
Golder, 2006). Some researchers argue that in the long term, changes in objective quality
can noticeably influence customer perceptions of quality (e.g., Bolton & Drew, 1991). For
instance, Easton & Jarrell (1998) and Hendricks & Singhal (2001) show that actual quality
initiatives take between five to 10 years to translate into higher profits. Mitra & Golder
(2006) find that in the consumer product industry, it takes on average over six years for a
change in objective quality to be fully reflected in customer perceptions of quality. They
argue that this delay is caused by uncertainty, lack of knowledge about objective quality,
high cognitive efforts required to adjust prior expectations, low involvement, and long
inter-purchase frequencies. Some studies have found a significant effect of one-period-
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lagged quality on the market share of certain products (e.g., Kopalle & Lehmann, 2001;
Mitra & Golder, 2006). Mitra & Golder show that in the first year after a quality change,
on average 20% of the total effect over time is realized. The academic literature is
inconsistent regarding the concurrent effects of changes in objective quality on perceived
quality; some studies have found a realized impact from 3% to 22% (e.g., Boulding et al.,
1999; Prabhu & Tellis, 2000; Kamakura et al., 2002), whereas others doubt the
significance of such an effect (e.g., Bettman et al., 1991).
Building on the above, I conclude that a change in a product’s objective safety brought
about by investment in safety measures affects perceived safety. However, the full impact
is only realized in the long run. All else being equal, it takes more time to reach a higher
percentage of the long-term effect (see Section 3.2 for a discussion of how I include this in
my model).

4.3. Preliminary Analyses
To model the investment problem in Section 4, I first need to define the equilibrium profit
of the low-risk firm, 𝝅∗𝑳 , as well as the probability density of contagion, 𝒇𝒕𝓣 (𝒕). In
Subsection 3.1, I study a duopoly market and model the relationship between equilibrium
profit and perceived safety. Using the results of Subsection 3.2, Subsection 3.3 quantifies
perceived safety as a function of time and investment level. In Subsection 3.2, the
relationship between objective safety and investment level is found and the probability
density of contagion risk is formulated.
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4.3.1.

Duopoly market structure

We consider a duopoly in which two profit maximizing firms, labeled high-risk (H) and
low-risk (L) with perceived safety level of 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑠𝐿 , choose a price level of 𝑝𝐻 and 𝑝𝐿 ,
where perceived safety is a measurable attribute of product with values in the interval [0,
1]. Building on Banker et al. (1998), I assume that the demand functions for two firms are
linear in price and safety as follows:
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆𝑠𝑗
where 𝑄𝑖 , 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜆 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖, 𝑗 ≡ 𝐿, 𝐻, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝐿 > 𝑠𝐻 .

(1)
Here,

𝑄𝑖 is the intrinsic demand potential parameter for firm i. I assume any shift in demand
caused by safety changes (in 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 ) is captured through the 𝛾𝑠𝑖 and 𝜆𝑠𝑗 terms; in
particular, 𝑄𝑖 does not depend on safety. The 𝛼 and 𝛾 parameters denote the demand
responsiveness to the firm’s own price and product safety, and 𝛽 and 𝜆 denote the demand
responsiveness to the rival’s price and product safety, respectively. I also assume that
demand for each firm is affected more by its own price and safety than those of its rivals,
that is, 𝛼 > 𝛽 and 𝛾 > 𝜆. This is a plausible assumption; otherwise, for example, firms will
not lose sales if they both raise their prices by one dollar or decrease their safety levels by
one unit. From (1), the profit, revenue minus expenses, is:
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 ( 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ) − 𝐹𝑖 = (𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆𝑠𝑗 )( 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ) − 𝐹𝑖

(2)

Maximizing 𝜋𝑖 with respect to 𝑝𝑖 produces:
𝑝𝑖∗ =
Substituting rival’s price, 𝑝𝑗∗ =

𝑄𝑖 +𝛽𝑝𝑗∗ +𝛾𝑠𝑖 −𝜆𝑠𝑗 +𝛼𝑐𝑖

(3)

2𝛼

𝑄𝑗 +𝛽𝑝𝑖∗ +𝛾𝑠𝑗 −𝜆𝑠𝑖 +𝛼𝑐𝑗
2𝛼

, into (3) produces:

𝑝𝑖∗ = 𝐴𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵𝑠𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖

(4)
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where

𝐴=
𝐵=
𝐶𝑖 =

(2𝛼𝛾−𝛽𝜆)

(5)

(4𝛼2 −𝛽 2 )
(𝛽𝛾−2𝛼𝜆)

(6)

(4𝛼2 −𝛽 2 )

2𝛼𝑄𝑖 +𝛽𝑄𝑗 +𝛼(2𝛼𝑐𝑖 +𝛽𝑐𝑗 )

(7)

(4𝛼2 −𝛽 2 )

for I = H and j = L, and for i = L and j = H. To find the demand associated with the
optimal price, I substitute (4) in (1) and find:
𝑞𝑖∗ =

𝑄𝑖 +𝛽𝑝𝑗∗ +𝛾𝑠𝑖 −𝜆𝑠𝑗 −𝛼𝑐𝑖
2

(8)

= 𝛼(𝑝𝑖∗ − 𝑐𝑖 )

We can also formulate the equilibrium profit 𝜋𝑖∗ in terms of optimal price 𝑝𝑖∗ by
substituting (4) and (8) into (2) to find:
𝜋𝑖∗ = (𝑝𝑖∗ − 𝑐𝑖 )𝑞𝑖∗ − 𝐹𝑖 = 𝛼(𝑝𝑖∗ − 𝑐𝑖 )2 − 𝐹𝑖

(9)

Since 𝛼 > 𝛽 and 𝛾 > 𝜆, I conclude from (5) and (7) that 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐴 are always positive.
However, according to (6), 𝐵 may take either positive or negative values. When 𝐵 is
positive, I can observe from (4) and (9) that increasing the safety level of the high-risk firm
will increase the profit of the low-risk firm. Banker et al. (1998) argues that B < 0 is
implausible. Accepting this argument for now, I assume that B < 0. From (6), I know that
𝐵 is negative if, and only if

𝛼
𝛽

>

2𝛾
𝜆

, that is, when the relative responsiveness of demand to

𝛼

𝛾

price 𝛽 is greater than twice the relative responsiveness of demand to safety 𝜆.

4.3.2.

Modeling contagion risk

As described earlier, contagion is generated by a triggering event, which in turn is caused
by an initiating event (Figure 1-2). For example, the 2003 global ban on Canadian beef was
triggered by a single case of mad cow disease detected on a farm in Alberta, suspected to
have been caused by contaminated cattle feed shipped from a livestock feed mill.
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Contagion starts immediately after a triggering event, but the occurrence of an initiating
event does not always result in a triggering event. To be precise:
𝑃𝑟{𝒞|𝒯} = 1

(10)

0 < 𝑃𝑟{𝒯|ℐ} ≤ 1

(11)

where 𝒞, 𝒯 and ℐ denote contagion, triggering event, and initiating event, respectively.
Given that initiating events are rare and their occurrences are independent, I can
consider the occurrence of initiating events in the investment horizon as a Poisson process.
This implies that the probability that the first initiating event happens before time 𝑡 has an
exponential distribution:
Pr{𝑡ℐ < 𝑡} = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜇𝑡

(12)

Here, 𝑡ℐ denotes the time of the initiating event and 𝜇 −1 represents the mean time to the
first event. Since initiating events are scarce and independent, I can assume that the
probability of two or more events within the investment horizon is negligible. The
probability of a triggering event before time t is then:
Pr{𝑡𝒯 < 𝑡} = 𝑃𝑟{𝒯|ℐ} Pr{𝑡ℐ < 𝑡}

(13)

where 𝑡𝒯 denotes the waiting time to the triggering event.
The conditional probability Pr{𝒯|ℐ} in (13) represents the probability that a firm’s
safety measures cannot detect a dormant initiating event or cannot tolerate the
consequences of an active initiating event. Given that initiating events are unavoidable, the
only option to address contagion is to reduce the probability of the triggering event. One
option is to invest in the safety of the firm that is at risk from the initiating event.
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To estimate the effect of investment level on Pr{𝒯|ℐ}, I apply the logistic regression
model used by Major (2002) and Bakshi et al. (2009) for estimation of disruption
probability:
Pr{𝒯|ℐ}

𝑙𝑛 (1−𝑃𝑟{𝒯|ℐ}) = 𝐼 − 𝜔𝑦

(14)

Here, 𝑦 ≥ 0 represents the safety investment level and parameters 𝐼 and 𝜔 > 0 in (14)
denote an intercept and coefficient, respectively. Assuming Pr{𝒯|ℐ} ≪ 1 (where “≪”
means “much less than”), and setting 𝓅𝑡0 = 𝑒 −𝐼 by, I can approximate Pr{𝒯|ℐ} as:
Pr{𝒯|ℐ} ≅ 𝓅𝑡0 𝑒 −𝜔𝑦

(15)

In fact, 𝓅𝑡0 denotes the conditional probability of the triggering event before
investment. Substituting (12) and (15) into (13) shows that the probability of triggering
event is:
Pr{𝑡𝒯 < 𝑡} = 𝓅t0 e−ωy (1 − e−μt ) .

(16)

Taking (10) into account, I have:
Pr{𝑡𝒞 < 𝑡} = Pr{𝑡𝒯 < 𝑡}

(17)

where 𝑡𝒞 is the starting time of contagion. Given (17), (16) shows the probability of
contagion at or before time 𝑡. If I differentiate with respect to 𝑡, I find that the probability
that the first contagion event occurs in a small interval of time of length 𝑑𝑡 starting at time
𝑡 is:
𝑓𝑡𝒯 (𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝓅𝑡0 𝑒 −𝜔𝑦 𝜇𝑒 −𝜇𝑡 𝑑𝑡.

(18)

Note that (18) represents an approximation to the values of a probability density function at
small values of 𝒕, under the assumptions made above. Below, I will use (18) in integrals
representing the loss in profits caused by a triggering event within an investment horizon.
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4.3.3.

Impact of investment on perceived safety

Investment in a high-risk rival increases the objective safety of its product either by
improving the rival’s capability to detect dormant initiating events or by increasing the
resilience of its operations against active initiating events. Since demand shift is caused by
changes in perceived, rather than objective, safety, I need to incorporate the relationship
between objective safety and perceived safety into my model. As discussed in Section 2.2,
objective safety affects perceived safety, but this effect is realized over time. All else being
equal, it takes more time to reach a higher percentage of the long-term effect. The impact
of the investment on perceived safety can be best approximated by an exponential function.
I assume that perceived safety captures the changes in the objective safety at the rate
of (1 − 𝑒 −𝜑𝑡 ), where φ is the adjustment rate and 𝑡 is elapsed time since investment. Then:
𝑠𝐻 (𝑦, 𝑡) = 𝑠𝐻0 + 𝜃 ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 (𝑦)(1 − 𝑒 −𝜑𝑡 )

(19)

where 𝑠𝐻0 and 𝑠𝐻 (𝑦, 𝑡) denote the perceived safety level of the high-risk firm before and
after investment, respectively, ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 (𝑦) refers to the change in the objective safety after
investment, and 𝜃 represents the percentage of the changes in objective safety captured by
perceived safety. ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 (𝑦) is defined as:
∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 (𝑦) = (𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 (𝑦) − 𝑠0 )

(20)

where 𝑠0 and 𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗 (𝑦) denote the objective safety levels of the high-risk firm before and
after investment, respectively.
Given that safety is complementary with risk level, I can assess objective safety from a
firm’s risk. Using (15), I get:
𝑠𝐻𝑜𝑏𝑗 (𝑦) = 1 − Pr{𝒯|ℐ} = 1 − 𝓅𝑡0 𝑒 −𝜔𝑦

(21)
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𝑠0 = 1 − 𝓅𝑡0

(22)

Substituting (21) and (22) into (20), I find:
∆𝑠𝐻 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑦) = 𝜃𝓅𝑡0 (1 − 𝑒 −𝜔𝑦 )

(23)

Using (23), I can reformulate (19) as:
𝑠𝐻 (𝑦, 𝑡) = 𝑠𝐻0 + 𝜃𝓅𝑡0 (1 − 𝑒 −𝜔𝑦 )(1 − 𝑒 −𝜑𝑡 )

(24)

We can now substitute 𝑠𝐻 (𝑦, 𝑡) into (4) and define the low-risk firm’s optimal price,
𝑝𝐿∗ , and subsequently equilibrium profit, 𝜋𝐿∗ , as functions of time and investment level y.

4.4. Modeling
4.4.1. Expected profit of a low-risk firm in the presence of contagion
We consider a market consisting of an over-complying (low-risk) and a minimumcomplying (high-risk) firm competing on price, where the low-risk firm is at risk of
contagion posed by the high-risk rival. Before the investment (t < 0), the levels of
perceived safety and price for the high-risk firm are 𝑠𝐻0 and 𝑝𝐻0 , and for the low-risk firm
are 𝑠𝐿0 and 𝑝𝐿0, respectively. At time t = 0, the low-risk firm makes an investment decision
regarding the high-risk firm’s safety level; from that time, the two firms continue to
compete on price as perceived safety of the high-risk firm approaches the maximum
achievable level (see (19)). From the perspective of the low-risk firm, the optimal safety
level of the high-risk firm is the level that maximizes the expected profit of the low-firm’s
investment for time horizon T.
We assume that for the low-risk firm, the marginal profit of investing in its own safety
is less than the marginal profit of investing in the safety of the high-risk firm. This is a
reasonable assumption because marginal return diminishes as investment increases, and by
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definition, the low-risk firm has already made much more internal safety investment than
the high-risk firm. I also assume that information is symmetric, and therefore the low-risk
firm knows how safe the high-risk firm is and how responsive it is to safety investment.

Figure 4-1: Effect of triggering event on the expected profit of a low-risk firm

As depicted above (Figure 4-1), contagion causes the profit of the low-risk firm to drop
from 𝜋𝐿∗ (𝑦, 𝑡𝒯 ) − 𝑦 to 𝜋̂𝐿∗ − 𝑦 at time 𝑡𝒯 and last for a period of 𝑇1 , where 𝑡𝒯 is a random
variable and denotes the waiting time to the triggering event. 𝜋𝐿∗0 represents the profit of
the low-risk firm before investment, 𝜋̂𝐿∗ is the average post-event profit of the low-risk
firm, and 𝑦 is the investment level that low-risk firm makes in the high-risk firm’s safety
for the investment horizon 𝑇. Depending on the nature of the triggering event, 𝑡𝒯 + 𝑇1
may be smaller or greater than 𝑇.
We now assume that the low-risk firm’s lost profit after the event is much greater than
the maximum reduction in the low-risk firm’s profit due to the increase in the high-risk
firm’s safety level following the investment. That is:
∗
∗
𝜋𝐿0
− 𝜋̂𝐿∗ ≫ 𝜋𝐿0
− 𝜋𝐿∗ (𝑦, 𝑡𝒯 + 𝑇1 )

(25)
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̂ 𝐿∗ +𝐹𝐿
𝜋

which is equivalent to 𝑝𝐿𝑚 − 𝑐𝐿 ≫ √

𝛼

, where 𝑝𝐿𝑚 is the low-risk firm’s price at (𝑡𝒯 +

𝑇1 ), 𝑐𝐿 is the variable cost, 𝐹𝐿 is fixed cost, 𝛼 is responsiveness of demand to the low-risk
firm’s own price, and ≫ means “is much greater than”. Actually, this is a necessary
assumption; otherwise, there would be no incentive for the low-risk firm to consider such
investment as an option. Assuming (25), I get:
∗
(𝜋𝐿∗ (𝑦, 𝑡) − 𝜋̂𝐿∗ ) ≅ (𝜋𝐿0
− 𝜋̂𝐿∗ )

(26)

We can now model the present value of the expected profit of the low-risk firm as:
𝑇

𝑇

𝐸(𝜋𝐿 (𝑦)) ≅ ∫0 𝜋𝐿∗ (𝑦, 𝑡)𝑒 −𝑟𝑡 𝑑𝑡 − ∫0 (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑒 −𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝒯 (𝑡) 𝑉𝑡𝒯 (𝜋∗𝐿0 − 𝜋̂𝐿∗ ) 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑦

(27)

∗
where 𝑉𝑡𝒯 (𝜋𝐿0
− 𝜋̂𝐿∗ ) represents the discounted value of expected loss at time 𝑡𝒯 < 𝑇 .
𝑇

∗

̂ 𝐿 ) 𝑑𝑡
𝑉𝑡𝒯 (𝜋∗𝐿0 − 𝜋̂𝐿∗ ) = ∫0 1 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 (𝜋∗𝐿0 − 𝜋

(28)

In (27), 𝑓𝑡𝒯 (𝑡) is the probability density of contagion which is defined in (18). From (4)
and (9), I know that 𝜋𝐿∗ (𝑦, 𝑡) = 𝛼(𝑝𝐿∗ (𝑦, 𝑡) − 𝑐𝐿 )2 − 𝐹𝐿 where 𝑝𝐿∗ = (AsL + B 𝑠𝐻 (𝑦, 𝑡) +
CL ), and 𝑠𝐻 (𝑦, 𝑡) is defined by (24). Differentiating (27) with respect to 𝑦, I get:
𝜕
𝐸(𝜋𝐿 (𝑦)) = 𝐷1 𝑒 −2𝜔𝑦 + 𝐷2 𝑒 −𝜔𝑦 − 1
𝜕𝑦

where

1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇
)−
𝑟𝑇

𝐷1 = −2𝜔𝛼𝑇(𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0 )2 ((

𝐷2 = 𝜔𝑇 (2𝛼(𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0 )2 ((

𝑐𝐿 )𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0 ((

1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇

)−(

1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇

) − 2(

1−𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇

2(

1−𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
1−𝑒 −(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)
+
(
))
(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇

1−𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇

)) +

(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇

)+(

1−𝑒 −(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇

∗
∗
(𝜋𝐿0
−𝜋
̂𝐿
)(1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 )

𝑟

Coefficient 𝐷1 is always negative because for 𝑓(𝑟𝑇) =
that 𝑓′(𝑟𝑇) =
that

𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 (𝑒 𝑟𝑇 −rT−1)
−(𝑟𝑇)2

≤ 0 and 𝑓"(𝑟𝑇) =

(29)

𝓅𝑡0 𝜇 (

)) + 2𝛼(𝑝𝐿0 −

1−exp−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇

1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇
𝑟𝑇

(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇

(31)

))

and 𝑟𝑇 > 0, I know

𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 (2𝑒 𝑟𝑇 −(𝑟𝑇)2 −2rT−2)
(𝑟𝑇)3

𝑓(𝑟𝑇) − 𝑓(𝑟𝑇 + 𝜑𝑇) > 𝑓(𝑟𝑇 + 𝜑𝑇) − 𝑓(𝑟𝑇 + 2𝜑𝑇),

(30)

which

≥ 0. This implies

is

equivalent

to
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(

1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇

−1
𝜔

𝑟𝑇

𝑙𝑛

𝑦∗ =

1−𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)
(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇

) − 2(

1−𝑒 −(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)
(2𝜑+𝑟)𝑇

+(

> 0, where 𝜑𝑇 > 0. The zeroes of (29) are

𝐷2 ±√∆
−2𝐷1
−1
𝜔

𝑙𝑛

, where ∆= D2 2 + 4D1 . I can demonstrate that (29) has a global maximum at
𝐷2 −√∆
−2𝐷1

if and only if:
D1 + D2 − 1 > 0

(32)

The expression D1 + D2 − 1 is the derivative of the expected profit at y=0.
Substituting the values of 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 from (30) and (31) into (32) generates:
(1−𝑢𝐿 )(1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 )
𝑟

1−𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇

𝓅𝑡0 μωα (

1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇

2𝛼𝜔𝐵𝜃𝓅𝑡0 ((

(1−𝑢𝐿 )(1−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 )
𝑟

where 𝑢𝐿 =

̂ 𝐿∗
𝜋
∗
𝜋𝐿0

𝑟

𝜇+𝑟

1−𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)) (𝑝𝐿0
(𝜑+𝑟)

)−(

𝓅𝑡0 𝜇𝜔𝐹𝐿 (

(33)

) (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿 )2 +

1−𝑒𝑥𝑝−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇+𝑟

− 𝑐𝐿 ) −

)−1>0

. The left side of the above expression is a simple quadratic in (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿 ),

which has two roots. Since the leading term has a positive coefficient, (33) holds if, and
only if, (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿 ) is less than the smaller root or greater than the larger root. The two
roots are 𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑧 ± √𝑧 2 +

𝐹𝐿
𝛼

+ ((1−𝑢

𝐿 )(1−𝑒
𝑟

1
−𝑟𝑇1 )

), where z is as

1−e−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
)
𝜇+𝑟

𝓅𝑡0 𝜇𝜔𝛼(

defined in (35).
The root corresponding to the negative sign is the smaller root, and must be negative.
However, (𝑝𝐿0 − 𝑐𝐿 ) < 0 is not possible. Therefore, (33) can be true only if (𝑝𝐿0 −
𝑐𝐿 ) exceeds the larger root, leading us to propose:

Proposition 1: For a low-risk firm, there is a threshold price 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 above which investment
in the safety measures of a high-risk rival will be always profitable.
77

Where
𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 ≡ 𝑧 + √

𝑧2

+

𝐹𝐿
𝛼

and

+ ((1−𝑢

1

−𝑟𝑇1 )
1−e−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝐿 )(1−𝑒
)
𝓅𝑡0 𝜇𝜔𝛼(
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)−( (𝜑+𝑟) ))
𝑟

−𝐵𝜃((

𝑧=

(34)
) + 𝑐𝐿
(35)

(1−𝑢𝐿 )(1−𝑒−𝑟𝑇1 ) 1−e−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
)
𝜇(
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

It is obvious that the expression under square root is always positive, indicating that
𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 always exists. According to Proposition 1, the optimal investment level 𝑦 ∗ =
−1
𝜔

𝐷 −∆

2
𝑙𝑛 −2𝐷
is strictly positive if, and only if, 𝑝𝐿0 is greater than 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 . From (24), we can see
1

that in the long run, 𝑦 ∗ will increase the perceived safety of the high-risk firm from 𝑠𝐻0 to
𝐷 −∆

2
𝑠𝐻0 + 𝜃𝓅𝑡0 (1 − 𝑙𝑛 −2𝐷
).
1

The sensitivity of threshold price, 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 , to the contributing factors is further
investigated (see Appendix 2 for proofs of comparative statistics). I use a numerical
example to support the analyses where needed. The factors contributing to threshold price
are classified into low-risk firm related factors including 𝑟, 𝑇, and 𝜋̂𝐿∗ , market related
factors including 𝛼, 𝜃, 𝐵, T1 and 𝜑, and high-risk firm related factors including 𝜔 and 𝓅𝑡0 ,
and the environment-related factor 𝜇.
According to the sensitivity analysis, threshold price is an increasing function of ω
(high-risk firm’s objective safety responsiveness to investment), but optimal investment is
concave in ω (Figure 4-2). The reason for this behavior is that the solution of the
investment problem generates an optimal ωy rather than optimal investment level y.
Higher ω decreases marginal investment cost, causing optimal ωy to rise. On the other
hand, higher ω means less investment is needed to achieve the optimal ωy, driving optimal
investment to decline. Such a contradiction causes optimal investment to be concave. All
78

other things constant, ω is expected to be smaller when the size of a high-risk firm is
larger, because a larger firm needs more investment to achieve the same safety level as a
small firm. Therefore, I expect that firm size and threshold price of the high-risk firm will
change in the same direction. On the other hand, smaller firms are more likely to be highrisk because they can be more cost constrained than large firms.

Figure 4-2: Impact of ω, on low-risk firm’s threshold price and optimal price
Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; B= - 0.0319; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9;
sH0=0.7; =0.009; =0.50; r=0.05; uL=0.2; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; =0.5

As shown in Figure 4-3, threshold price decreases when the risk of the high-risk firm
represented by 𝓅t0 rises and the expected time to initiating event denoted by 1/𝜇, declines.
When the risk of the high-risk firm increases from 0.001 to 0.01, the threshold price curve
shifts down and crosses the low-risk firm’s price faster.
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Figure 4-3: Impact of the risk of initiating event on threshold price
Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; B= - 0.0000319; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9;
sH0=0.7; =0.50; r=0.05; uL=0.2; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; =0.5; ω=0.00001

Figure 4-4: Impact of perception adjustment rate () on threshold price
Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; B= - 0.0319; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9;
sH0=0.7; =0.009; =0.50; =0.00001; r=0.05; uL=0.2; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14

Regarding market related factors, the direction of the shift in threshold price is the
same as for 𝜑 (rate of the adjustment of public perception of safety with actual safety), 𝜃
(rate of objective safety contribution to perceived safety), and |𝐵| (absolute value of the
sensitivity of the optimal price of a firm to the perceived safety of its rival’s product), but
indefinite for 𝛼 (demand responsiveness to the firm’s own price). The longer it takes for
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the market to adjust its perception (the larger the 𝜑), the smaller the value of threshold
price will be (Figure 4-4.). According to Mitra & Golder (2006), adjustment in perception
is relatively faster for product categories with higher quality variance and higher purchase
frequency. Therefore, I expect markets dominated with product categories of these types to
have relatively larger threshold prices.
Larger |𝐵| raises the threshold price and lessens the price. Larger |𝐵| amplifies the
negative effect of the improvement of a rival’s safety resulting from investment, and hence
has a negative impact on investment profitability. In fact, an ideal market for investment is
one with |𝐵| = 0. In contrast to |𝐵|, the optimal price sensitivity to the firm’s own
perceived safety denoted by “𝐴” has no impact on the threshold prices; however, “𝐴” has a
direct relation with price, and therefore investment in markets with higher “𝐴” values are
more likely to be profitable.
Similar to “𝐴”, an increase in the optimal price intercept 𝐶𝐿 raises the price. 𝐶𝐿 is
directly related to the potential intrinsic demands of both high-risk and low-risk firms
(𝑄𝐻 and 𝑄𝐿 ), which are proxies of the firm’s size. Therefore, price has a direct relation to
the sizes of both high-risk and low-risk firms. Given that 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 and the high-risk firm’s size
change in the same direction, total potential intrinsic demand constant (𝑄𝐻 + 𝑄𝐿 = 𝑐𝑡𝑒),
the larger the relative size of the low-risk firm to the high-risk rival, the more likely the
investment will be profitable.
Larger 𝑇1 (duration of the impact of adverse event) and smaller 𝜋̂𝐿∗ (the post-event
expected profit) generate smaller threshold prices. Smaller 𝜋̂𝐿∗ is the result of higher risk
perception by the public. Slovic (1987) shows that the public is more anxious when a
hazard’s scores on “unknown risk” and “dread risk” factors are high and argues that
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adverse consequence of the events with a high score on these two factors is more likely to
spread to other firms. For industries such as the nuclear industry, which experience more
hazards of these types, expected post-event profit would be smaller, and hence the
investment is more likely to be profitable.
Regarding the low-risk firm’s discount rate, 𝑟, the sensitivity analysis shows that
threshold price and 𝑟 move in the same direction (Figure 4-5). Higher discount rate
decreases the present value of the expected cost, making investment less attractive.
Therefore, over-estimation of discount rate may undermine the severity of contagion.

Figure 4-5: Impact of discount rate I on low-risk firm’s threshold price
Note: T=10; T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9; sH0=0.7; =0.009;
=0.50; =0.00001; r=0.05; uL=0.5; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; φ=0.5

Variation of investment horizon (T) has an indefinite impact on threshold price, but
when |𝐵| approaches zero they move in the opposite direction. This suggests that under
certain circumstances, a longer investment horizon can cause an investment to become
feasible or more profitable (Figure 4-6). When |𝐵| is relatively large, a longer investment
horizon causes the low-risk firm to lose more market share, eroding the profit gained from
expected loss reduction and causing T and 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝐿 to move in the same direction. In addition
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to |𝐵|, other factors can also constrain investment horizon. For instance, when a high-risk
firm’s safety vulnerability derives from its product or technology, the investment horizon
cannot exceed the product or technology life cycles. This suggests that investment is more
likely to be unfeasible for high-tech industries.

Figure 4-6: Impact of investment horizon T on low-risk firm’s threshold price
Note: T1=5; =300,051,000; A=0.49; CL=1.63; FL=$33,000,000; cL=$1.0; sL=0.9; sH0=0.7; =0.009; =0.50;
=0.00001; r=0.05; uL=0.5; pt0=0.010; pL0= $2.14; φ=0.5

Finally, the cost structure of the low risk firm can affect threshold price. A decrease in
the variable cost of a low-risk firm, 𝑐𝐿 , causes the threshold price to decline and leads to a
higher price. Similarly, smaller fixed cost, 𝐹𝐿 , results in a smaller threshold price, but has
no impact on the price. When fixed cost and variable cost are inversely interdependent (an
increase of one causes the other to decrease), the impact of cost structure on investment
profitability is indefinite.
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4.4.2.

Investment profitability under quantity competition

So far, I have assumed that firms compete on price. I can also assume that firms compete
on quantity, where prices are determined by the inverse demand functions matching
customer demand with the quantities supplied by the competing firms, and their perceived
safety levels. That is:
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽𝑞𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆𝑠𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐿, 𝐻, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗

(36)

where 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜆, 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 are the same parameters I already defined for (1) and 𝑃𝑖 is
the intrinsic price for firm 𝑖. By following the same approach used in section 3.1, I find:
𝑝𝑖∗ = 𝛼(𝐴′ 𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵 ′ 𝑠𝑗 + 𝐶′𝑖 ) + 𝑐𝑖
where

𝐴′ =

(2𝛼𝛾+𝛽𝜆)
(4𝛼2 −𝛽 2 )

, 𝐵′ =

(−𝛽𝛾−2𝛼𝜆)
(4𝛼2 −𝛽 2 )

and 𝐶′𝑖 =

(37)

2𝛼𝑄𝑖 −𝛽𝑄𝑗 +𝛼(2𝛼𝑐𝑖 −𝛽𝑐𝑗 )
(4𝛼2 −𝛽 2 )

.

From Section 4.1, I know that an ideal market for investment is one where 𝐵 ′ = 0;
however, contrary to 𝐵 in (6), 𝐵 ′ can hardly obtain a value equal or close to zero. 𝐵′
asymptotically nears zero when 4𝛼 2 − 𝛽 2 goes to infinity or when both 𝛽𝛾 and 𝛼𝜆
approach zero. 4𝛼 2 − 𝛽 2 goes to infinity when price is much more sensitive to a firm’s
own quantity than its rival’s quantity, and 𝛽𝛾 and 𝛼𝜆 approach zero when at least two of
the parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝜆 are close to zero. While plausible, these extreme cases violate
the assumption that price depends on the quantity and safety level of both of the
companies. In other words, in a market where price is meaningfully dependent on quantity
and safety, it is unlikely that 𝐵′ nears zero. Using the same reasoning used in Section 4.1, I
can show that the low-risk firm threshold price and changes of |𝐵′| move in the same
direction. Therefore, I propose:
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Proposition 2: The investment is less likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as
opposed to price.

4.4.3.

Investment profitability in the presence of a neutral firm

When a market only consists of high-risk and low-risk firms, condition (34) is the only
condition for the profitability of the investment. However, a market may also consist of a
neutral firm (N) that neither invests nor needs investment. As Appendix 3 explains, I can
formulate 𝑝𝑖∗ , the optimal price of firm 𝑖 in this market, as:
𝑝𝑖∗ = 𝐴′′𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵′′𝑠−𝑖 + 𝐶′′𝑖
−2𝛽𝜆+(2𝛼−𝛽)𝛾

𝛽𝛾−2𝛼𝜆

(38)

𝑄 (2𝛼−𝛽)+𝛽𝑄

𝑖
−𝑖
where 𝐴′′ = (2𝛼+𝛽)(2𝛼−2𝛽) , 𝐵′′ = (2𝛼+𝛽)(2𝛼−2𝛽) , 𝐶′′𝑖 = (2𝛼+𝛽)(2𝛼−2𝛽)
and 𝑠−𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗 −

𝑠𝑖 for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿, 𝑁, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Under the new market setting, profitability will not be the sole
requirement for investment, and the low-risk firm needs to make sure that the investment
will not put the neutral firm at a cost disadvantage relative to the high-risk firm; otherwise,
the investment may be seen as collusion and deemed illegal. The profitability condition for
the neutral firm is similar to that of the low-risk firm in (32), but since the low-risk firm
does not invest, its profitability condition is formulated as:
D1 𝑁 + D2 𝑁 > 0

(39)

Where D1 𝑁 and D2 𝑁 are the coefficients of the derivative of the neutral firm’s profit
function similar to 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 in (30) and (31), except that 𝑟, 𝐵, 𝐹𝐿 , 𝑝𝐿0, 𝑐𝐿 and 𝑢𝐿 are
replced by 𝑟𝑁 , 𝐵′′, 𝐹𝑁 , 𝑝𝑁0, 𝑐𝑁 and 𝑢𝑁 . The solution of equation (39) with respect to
(𝑝𝑁0 − 𝑐𝑁 ) leads us to propose:
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Proposition 3: For a neutral firm, there is a threshold price 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑁 above which it will never
be negatively affected by the investment of a low-risk firm in the safety measure of a highrisk rival.
where

𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑁 ≡ 𝑧𝑁 + √𝑧𝑁 2 +

and

𝐹𝑁
𝛼

+ 𝑐𝑁

(40)

1−𝑒−𝑟𝑁 𝑇
1−𝑒−(𝜑+𝑟𝑁 )𝑇
)−(
))
𝑟𝑁
(𝜑+𝑟𝑁 )

−𝐵′′ 𝜃((

𝑧𝑁 =

(1−𝑢𝑁 )(1−𝑒−𝑟𝑁 𝑇1 )
1−e−(𝜇+𝑟𝑁 )𝑇
𝜇(
)
𝑟𝑁
𝜇+𝑟𝑁

Equation (40) suggest that the threshold price of the neutral firm is independent of the
attributes of the low-risk and high-risk firms and is sensitive only to the environment risk
represented by 𝜇, market attributes including price sensitivity to rivals’ perceived safety,
denoted by B, and the rate of the adjustment of public perception of safety with actual
safety, 𝜑.

4.5. Discussion
The supply chain risk management steps for contagion risk are similar to steps for other
risks, namely: risk identification, risk measurement, risk assessment, risk evaluation, risk
mitigation, and risk monitoring.13 However, one thing that makes the management of

13

According to Tummala & Schoenherr (2011), the SCRM process has the following six steps:
1. Risk Identification – involves a comprehensive and structured identification of supply chain risks.
2. Risk Measurement – determination of the consequences of all identified supply chain risks along with
magnitudes of their impact.
3. Risk Assessment – assessing likelihood of each risk factor.
4. Risk Evaluation – consists of two sub-steps of risk ranking and risk acceptance.
a) Risk ranking – involves determining risk exposure value of each risk factor based on consequence
severity and probability of occurrence and grouping risks into classes based on risk exposure values.
b) Risk Acceptance – after supply chain risks are grouped into classes, they are further classified
into unacceptable, tolerable, or acceptable risks based on criteria defined by the organization.
5. Risk Mitigation and Contingency Plans – risk mitigation and contingency plans are developed taking into
account resource constraints faced by the organization.
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contagion different is the identification of the triggering events. As discussed in Chapters 2
and 3, several factors, including the industry, size of the recalling firm, and the signal value
of the events contribute to the likelihood and magnitude of contagion. The other difference
is the risk mitigation strategy. As the source of contagion is a rival, a (low-risk) focal firm
needs to help its (high-risk) rivals improve their safety measures to mitigate contagion risk.
I discuss how a firm can identify potential triggering events and the strategies it can adopt
to manage contagion risk.

4.5.1.

Triggering Event

Firms need to identify events that can trigger contagion to assess and manage the contagion
risk associated with a certain event. There are three plausible types of contagion-triggering
events. First, black swans: major, unplanned events that have a significant impact. For
example, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and the Fukushima
nuclear reactor disaster in 2011 fall into this category. These are implausible, extreme
events with little or no objective basis for a firm to predict, and as such, cannot be
identified before they happen.
Second, gray swans: rare, but plausible, events with the potential to destabilize an
industry or a market. For example, beef recalls due to mad cow disease and corporate
social responsibility events in the apparel industry (e.g., the Rana Plaza building collapse in
Bangladesh in 2013) are categorized as gray swan events. These events are so infrequent
that a firm or its rivals may never have experienced them, but past occurrences of such

6. Risk Monitoring and Control – involves monitoring performance of risk response plans, taking corrective
and preventive actions to account for deviations from desired SC performance, abnormal cases or SC
disruptions.
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events point to their potential. Companies can identify such events by analyzing historical
data on negative events that have occurred in the same industry but different markets.
The third type of triggering events falls between the black swans and gray swans.
Similar to black swans, these events are rare, high-profile, difficult to predict, and beyond
the realm of normal expectations within the boundaries of the firm’s industry; however,
similarities between the firm’s industry and another industry that has experienced
contagion may increase the plausibility that such rare events occur. For example, the recent
Volkswagen emission scandal was the first time that a recognized European automaker has
violated regulations so blatantly, but it was not the first time a well-known European brand
was involved in an operational breach. In 2013, beef burgers sold under Tesco
Supermarket’s Everyday Value brand were found to contain undeclared horse meat,
sometimes up to 100% of the meat content. Investigations later revealed that the complex,
Europe-wide supply chains used by Tesco included companies that were fraudulently
labelling horse meat.
While Volkswagen and Tesco operate in different industries, both companies produce
commodities with volatile prices, are fiercely competitive, and have long, complex supply
chains. Given that these shared characteristics increase the risk of opportunism, an
operational breach in the automotive industry, such as the 2015 Volkswagen emission
scandal, was conceivable after the Tesco horse meat scandal was exposed. Although it is
difficult to identify these types of events, firm can expose events that could affect its
market or supply chain by finding similarities between industries and looking at historical
data on adverse events that have occurred in the same market.
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4.5.2.

Approaches to contagion risk management

Contagion risk management strategies can be classified into reactive and proactive types.
In the reactive approach, a firm attempts to minimize the consequences of an adverse event
happening to a rival; in the proactive approach, a firm’s objective is to prevent or decrease
the probability of the triggering event. As discussed, contagion can affect a firm by
interrupting either its supply or demand, or by increasing its operating cost due to tighter
regulations. Firms can use strategic public relations to manage the consequences of
contagion in order to address the risk of supply or demand disruption. By publicizing
information, a firm attempts to convince its stakeholders that it is free of the problems that
have recently plagued a rival. When executed effectively, this approach can ease
consumers’ minds and increase a firm’s market share. For example, after Tesco’s horse
meat scandal in 2013, competitors such as Morrison’s, bought multi-page advertisements
highlighting their "integrated supply chain" and the reliability of their meat products.
Similarly, meat producer associations in the UK, including The National Farmers Union
and the British Pork Executive, ran ads encouraging consumers not only to buy quality
meat products, but also to buy local or British meat. One tagline read: "Quality Assured.
Now more than ever, it's important to know that the meat that you're buying comes from a
trusted source". While this approach can be effective, it can also backfire; a poorly planned
risk communication strategy can worsen the situation by confusing stakeholders and
further spreading fear and negative opinions.
Another effective strategy to manage the risk of increases in operating costs due to
tighter safety regulations after an event is lobbying. Lobbying is the act of attempting to
influence decisions made by government officials, such as legislators and regulatory
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agency members. For example, Jack in the Box used lobbying to manage contagion as
mentioned in the previous section. However, this in itself can pose a risk of negative
publicity if the industry is seen to be resisting changes that could make it safer in the eyes
of the general public.
Self-regulating is a strategy to prevent contagion and involves collaborating with other
firms to set and enforce rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the industry
(Gupta and Lad, 1983). Self-regulation complements existing laws by supplementing rules
to govern the behavior of firms. Industries choose self-regulation in response to both the
lack of government regulation and the threat of excessive government regulation (Sharma
et al., 2010). For example, the Forest Stewardship Council was formed in response to
industry concerns about the lack of government regulation to address the sustainability of
natural resources. Alternatively, self-regulation may be implemented in response to
catastrophic events, such as the formation in the U.S. of the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations after the Three Mile Island accident to set power plant safety guidelines.
Investing in the safety of high-risk rivals is a preventative strategy to improve safety
and regulatory adherence. Under certain circumstances, investing in the safety of high-risk
rivals can be profitable for the investing firm. Investing in a high-risk rival increases the
objective safety of its product, either by improving their ability to detect dormant triggers,
or by increasing the resilience of its operations against active triggers.

4.6. Summary and Conclusion
Herein, I seek to highlight for decision makers the issue of contagion risk, or the
probability that a firm is adversely affected by the negative externalities of rivals’
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operational failures. The large number of industry-wide crises caused by operational
failures of a single firm indicates that firms are at risk of contagion, a situation that cannot
be addressed by internal investment. In this research, I explore whether investment in the
safety measures of a high-risk rival is a profitable mitigating strategy. My research
indicates that for a low-risk firm, there is a threshold price above which such investment
would be profitable, and this price is a function of the attributes of firms, market, and
environment. As expected, the threshold price is lower when the consequence of contagion
is more drastic or when the probability of a triggering or initiating event is higher. One of
the factors that affect the threshold price is the rate that public perception of safety is
adjusted to actual safety. My analysis shows that the slower the rate of adjustment, the
smaller the threshold price will be. I also find that the threshold price is higher when the
low-risk firm’s discount rate is larger. The most important factor that affects the investment
decision is parameter 𝐵, the sensitivity of the optimal price of the low-risk firm to the
perceived safety of the high-risk rival. When sensitivity is high, investment could be
unprofitable, even if the risk of contagion is significant. When sensitivity is close to zero,
the low-risk firm can decrease the threshold price and turn an unprofitable investment into
a profitable one by extending the investment horizon. I find that the investment is less
likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as opposed to price. When a neutral firm
is added to the model, investment of the low-risk firm in the high-risk rival may be illegal
if it puts the neutral firm at cost disadvantage. There is also a threshold price for the neutral
firm above which the firm will not be negatively affected by the investment.
It is worthwhile to comment on whether it is reasonable to expect similar results in a
model with spillover effects. The fear generated by an event is amplified as it passes
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through social links, causing a negative reaction disproportionate to the actual severity of
the event. Since fundamental links generally lack such amplification property, it is
expected that a small triggering event would not cause a huge effect. In other words, a
spillover effect is expected to be significant only if the triggering event is large. On the
other hand, it is reasonable to believe that the potential severity of a triggering event has a
direct relationship to the size of the firm to which the event happens. This means that a
low-risk firm is at risk of spillover only if the high-risk firm is larger than, or comparable
in size to, the low-risk firm. However, as indicated in my earlier discussion in Section 4.1,
I know that the larger the relative size of high-risk rival to the low-risk firm, the less likely
the investment will be profitable. This suggests that when the channel of risk propagation
is fundamental, there is less chance that the investment will pay off.
This paper contributes to SCRM literature by introducing the notion of contagion risk,
formulating perceived safety, addressing the impacts of firms’ and market’s attributes on
contagion risk, and proposing a new co-opetition approach for mitigating contagion risk.
On the practical side, this research underscores the need for low-risk firms to address
contagion risk and helps them decide when to consider industry level investment as a
contagion mitigating strategy.
In this paper, I focus on a simple duopoly market where firms compete only on price in
the absence of moral-hazard and free-rider problems, and under the assumption of
information symmetry. Future research can investigate the profitability of the safety
investment in a market with multiple high-risk and low-risk firms competing on price and
safety, both when firms of a type (low-risk or high-risk) are identical and when they are
not. When optimal investment levels of low-risk firms are different, one can explore
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whether low-risk firms should collaborate and what the optimal level of investment would
be for each firm and society. Future research may also explore how to overcome free-rider
and moral-hazard problems and incorporate asymmetric information about the type of
high-risk firm.
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Appendix 4-1
Table A1.1 Notifications definitions
Notation

Explanation

Notation

Explanation

-H

High-risk firm

- 𝑡ℐ

Time at which initiating event happens

-L

Low-risk firm

- 𝑡𝒯

Time at which triggering event happens

-N

Neutral firm

-y

Investment level

-

Demand responsiveness to firm’s own price

- 𝓅t0

Probability of triggering event before investment

-β

Demand responsiveness to rival’s price
Demand responsiveness to the safety of firm’s own
product
Demand responsiveness to the safety of rival’s product

-ω

High-risk firm’s objective safety responsiveness to investment

- 1/

Average time to first event
Rate of objective safety contribution to perceived safety

-
-
-

Qi

Intrinsic demand potential parameter of firm i

-
- 𝑓𝑡𝒯 (𝑡)

-

i

Profit of firm i

- 𝑠𝐻0 / 𝑠0

Perceived/Objective safety of high-risk firm before investment

-T

Investment Horizon

- 𝑝𝐿𝑚

price of the low-risk firm at 𝑡𝒯 + 𝑇1

- T1

Duration of the impact of adverse event

- 𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗

Objective safety of high-risk firm after investment
Change of objective safety of high-risk firm after investment

Probability density of contagion

-

pi

Price of firm i

- ∆𝑠𝐻 𝑜𝑏𝑗

-

si

Perceived (product) safety level of firm i

- 𝑓(𝜋̂𝐿 )

Distribution of the post-event profit of low-risk firm
Average optimal post-event profit of low-risk firm

-

qi

Demand of firm i

- 𝜋̂𝐿∗

-

ci

Variable cost of firm i

-

𝑦

∗

Coefficients of the derivative of low-risk firm’s profit function

Fixed cost of firm i

-

- 𝑝𝑖∗
- 𝑞𝑖∗

Optimal price of firm i

- 𝑝𝐿0

Price of the low-risk firm before investment

Demand associated with optimal price of firm i

- 𝑟𝑖

Discount rate of firm i

- A,A'

Optimal price sensitivity to firm’s own safety(duopoly)

- A''

Optimal price sensitivity to firm’s own safety (oligopoly)

- B,B'

Optimal price sensitivity to rival’s safety (duopoly)

- B''

Optimal price sensitivity to rival’s safety (oligopoly)

Optimal price intercept of firm i (duopoly)

- Ci''

Optimal price intercept of firm i (oligopoly)

-𝒯

Triggering event

- ui

Ratio of post-event profit to pre-event profit of firm i

-ℐ

Initiating event

-𝒞

Contagion

-

Rate of the adjustment of public perception of safety with actual
safety

-

-

Fi

D1,D2

Ci, C'i

Optimal investment level
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Appendix 4-2
In this appendix, the sensitivity of threshold price 𝑝𝑡ℎ to contributing variables is analyzed. From (A1.21), I have:
𝑝𝑡ℎ = 𝑧1 +
where

−𝐵𝜃 ((

√𝑧12

(A2.1)

𝐹𝐿
+ + 𝑧2 + 𝑐𝐿
𝛼

(A2.2)

1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇
1 − 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
)
−
(
))
𝑟
(𝜑 + 𝑟)

𝑧1 =

(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )(1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 ) 1 − 𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝜇(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟
1
𝑧2 =
−𝑟𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )(1 − 𝑒 1 )
1 − 𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝓅
𝜇𝜔𝛼
(
)
𝑡0
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

(A2.3)

Then, for any variable 𝑋, I have:
𝜕
𝑝 =
𝜕𝑋 𝑡ℎ

1+

𝑧1

𝜕
(𝑧 ) +
𝜕𝑋 1

1

𝜕
𝜕𝑋

(A2.4)

𝐹
√𝑧12 + 𝐹𝐿 + 𝑧2
2√𝑧12 + 𝐿 + 𝑧2
(
)
𝛼
𝛼
𝜕
𝜕
Since the coefficients of 𝑧1 and 𝑧2 in (A2.4) are positive, its sign depends only on 𝜕𝑋 (𝑧1 ) and 𝜕𝑋 (𝑧2 ). In the following, I
compute (A2.4) for variables 𝑇, 𝑟, 𝜑, 𝜃, 𝜇, 𝓅𝑡0 , 𝜔, |𝐵| 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝐿 , assuming 𝐵 < 0.
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Table A2.1 sensitivity of the threshold price of the low-risk firm to the contributing variables
∂
(z )
∂X 2

X

𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1
) + (𝜇 + 𝑟) (1 −
)
−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1
1 − exp
(
)
(
)
𝑟𝑇1
(𝜇 + 𝑟)𝑇
>0
−𝑟𝑇
−(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
)
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0 𝜇(1 − 𝑒 1 )(1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝

𝑟 (1 −
r

𝜕
(𝑧 )
𝜕𝑋 1
𝜕
1
𝜕𝑟
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+r
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜃𝐵 (
−
)
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟
−𝑟𝑇
−(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
𝜕 1−𝑒
𝑒
−1
−𝜃𝐵 (
−
)
𝜕𝑟
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟
−
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟
>0

𝜕
𝑝
𝜕𝑋 𝑡ℎ

>0

Te−(φ+r)T e−(φ+r)T − 1
−θB (
−
)
−φ − r
(−φ − r)2
>0
(1 − uL )μ(1 − e−rT1 )(1 − exp −(μ+r)T )

0

>0



1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝐵 (
−
)
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟
>0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

0

>0



−𝑟
𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
−
𝜇(𝜇 + 𝑟) 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
<0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0 𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

𝓅𝑡0

−1
<0
1
−
𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0 2 𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

0

<0

ω

−1
<0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝛼𝜔 2 𝓅𝑡0 𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

0

<0



𝜕
𝜕𝜇

1
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟
<0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜃𝐵 (
−
)
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟

<0
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Table A2.1 sensitivity of the threshold price of the low-risk firm to the contributing variables (cont’d)
∂
(z )
∂X 2
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
𝜃(
−
)
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟
>0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

X

|𝐵|

1
>0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )2 𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0 𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

𝑢𝐿

−𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1
2

T1

1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0 𝜇 (
) (
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟
𝜕
(𝑧 ) = −
𝜕𝑇 2

<0

𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
2

1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝛼𝜔𝓅𝑡0 𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

𝜕
(𝑧 )
𝜕𝑋 1

𝜕
𝑝
𝜕𝑋 𝑡ℎ

0

>0

1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1
−𝜃𝐵 (
−
)
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟
>0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )2 𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

>0

1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1 −𝑟𝑇1
𝜃𝐵 (
−
)𝑒
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟
<0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟

<0

<0

1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 − 1 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
−𝜃𝐵 (
−
)𝑒
−𝜃𝐵(𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 − 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 )
𝑟
−𝜑 − 𝑟
−
2
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
(1
)𝜇
−
𝑢
(
)
(
)
𝐿
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 𝑒 −(𝜑+r)𝑇 − 1
−𝜃𝐵 (
−
)
𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 − 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇
𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
𝑟𝑇
(−𝜑 − 𝑟)𝑇
=
(
−
)>0
1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇1 1 − 𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇 1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝑇 1 − 𝑒 −(𝜑+𝑟)𝑇 1 − 𝑒 −(𝜇+𝑟)𝑇
(1 − 𝑢𝐿 )𝜇 (
)(
)
−
𝑟
𝜇+𝑟
𝑟𝑇
(𝜑 + 𝑟)𝑇
(𝜇 + 𝑟)𝑇
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑡ℎ
Since the sign of (𝑧1 ) is positive, the sign of
will be indefinite, but if |𝐵| ≪ 1, then 𝑧2 ≪ 𝑧1 . Under this condition, I have 𝑝𝑡ℎ ≅
𝜕
(𝑧 ) = −
𝜕𝑇 1

T

𝜕𝑇

√

𝐹𝐿
𝛼

+ 𝑧2 + 𝑐𝐿 which means sign of

𝜕𝑇

𝜕
𝜕𝑇

𝑝𝑡ℎ depends only on 𝑧2 . Therefore, I conclude:
𝜕
<0
𝑝 {
𝜕𝑇 𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒

𝑓𝑜𝑟 |−𝐵| ≪ 1
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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Appendix 4-3
In this Appendix, I compute the coefficients of optimal price discussed in
proposition 3 where a high-risk firm (H), a low-risk firm (L), and a neutral firm (N)
competing on price and demand depends on both price and safety. The parameters
used are similar to those defined in equation (1), unless otherwise indicated.
Assuming demand has a linear relationship to the rival firm’s price and safety, I
have:
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖 ) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖 )

(A3.1)

where 𝑝 = ∑𝑖 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑠 = ∑𝑖 𝑥𝑠𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁
Using (A3.1), I can then formulate profit of firm 𝑖 as:
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 (𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖 ) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖 ))

(A3.2)

Maximizing 𝜋𝑖 with respect to 𝑝𝑖 I get:
𝑝𝑖∗ =

(𝑄𝑖 +𝛽(𝑝−𝑝𝑖∗ )+𝛾𝑠𝑖 −𝜆(𝑠−𝑠𝑖 ))

(A3.3)

2𝛼

which is equivalent to:
(𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖∗ ) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖 )) = 2𝛼𝑝𝑖∗

(A3.4)

Summing (A3.3) for the all three firms, I get:
∑𝑖(𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖∗ ) + 𝛾𝑠𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖 )) = ∑𝑖 2𝛼𝑝𝑖∗

(A3.5)

which is equivalent to:
𝑝=

(𝑄+𝛽2𝑝+γs−𝜆2𝑥)

(A3.6)

2𝛼

where 𝑄 = ∑𝑖 𝑄𝑖 . Substituting (A3.6) into (A3.3), I obtain
𝑝𝑖∗ = A′𝑠𝑖 + B′𝑠−𝑖 + 𝐶′i
−2βλ+(2α−β)γ

βγ−2αλ

where A′ = (2α+β)(2α−2β) , B′ = (2α+β)(2α−2β) , C′i =

(A3.7)
Qi (2α−β)+βQ−i
(2α+β)(2α−2β)

,

s−i = 𝑠 −

si and Q −i = 𝑄 − Qi
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Chapter 5. Conclusions and Implications
5.1.1.

Summary and conclusion

This dissertation seeks to help managers recognize, identify, and address
"contagion risk", an interdependent risk that is well understood in the finance and
marketing areas, but has not yet been adequately studied in the supply chain and
operations management domain. The dissertation discusses the concept of
contagion in the area of Supply Chain Management for the first time; therefore,
some shortfalls might exist, which will be addressed in future works.
The first essay, “Dynamics of Contagion Risk”, theorizes how the failure of
rivals in risk management can unfavorably affect other firms’ supply, demand, and
operations. Building on the decision making and risk literature, I introduce the
notion of "stakeholder identity", which is based on the degree to which a
stakeholder’s risk judgment is objective as opposed to subjective. I contend that the
closer the identity of the stakeholder is to absolute-lay, the more its judgments and
subsequent decisions will be based on biased measures, including (a) signal value
of the event, (b) similarity between the focal firm and the liable rival, and (c) trust
in the focal firm’s risk management. The results derived from this essay have
important implications for supply chain and operations management scholarship, in
that it explores contagion risk in the context of decision making processes,
highlights the role of stakeholders as agents of risk, and conceptualizes and
integrates various types of contagion into a single process model.
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The second essay aims to provide empirical evidence on the contagion effect by
measuring the average abnormal return of the industry following a product harm
recall. My results evidence that in some industries, under certain circumstances, the
risk of contagion could be serious, even when the adverse event is familiar and nonextreme, such as product recalls. The findings show, as predicted, that the
contagion is more likely to happen when the number of connected casualties to the
recall or its signal value is larger or when the abnormal return of the recalling firm
is more negative. These findings are important for two reasons. First, they
demonstrate the risk of having an unsafe rival; second, they explain why the
findings of other research about the contagion effect are mixed.
The third essay, “Management of Contagion Risk”, explores whether and when
investment in the safety measures of a high-risk rival is a profitable mitigating
strategy. My research results indicate that for a low-risk firm, there is a threshold
product price above which such investment would be profitable. The results
demonstrate, as expected, that the threshold price is lower when the consequence of
contagion is more drastic or when the probability of contagion is higher. The results
also show that the sensitivity of the product price of the low-risk firm to the
perceived safety of the rival’s product has a reverse relationship to the profitability
of the investment. According to my analytical model, a low-risk firm can turn an
unprofitable investment into a profitable one by extending the investment horizon;
however, the investment is less likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity, as
opposed to price. My third essay contributes to the literature by formulating
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perceived safety and proposing a new co-opetition approach for managing
contagion risk.
In summary, my dissertation has identified a new research direction that can
generate novel research questions on risk management in supply chain
management. Specifically, I introduce the notions of contagion risk, classify
contagion risk according to the type of triggering event and form of contagion
manifestation, and highlight the underlying role of stakeholder as the agent of
contagion risk. On the practical side, my findings help risk managers design more
effective risk management strategies in supply chain by integrating the risks that are
imposed by rivals and considering the new collaboration opportunities discussed in
the third essay.

5.1.2.

Managerial Implications

Contagion is a serious threat, not only because it can be triggered by non-severe
events, but also because its impact could be quite drastic in extreme cases.
Managers should refrain from underestimating the risk of contagion because of its
low frequency. Using expected value for assessing the risk of low probability/ high
impact type of events markedly distorts their importance relative to high
probability/low impact events. For low probability/high impact events, managers
should have contingency plans in place to mitigate their maximum impact if they
occur.
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While all firms are at risk of contagion, low-risk firms should take it more
seriously because their safety investments cannot protect them against the reaction
of timid stakeholders fearing an event that is happening to a rival.
The fact that larger firms have more resources to invest in their safety measures
implies that those firms are generally safer than their smaller rivals. The managers
of larger firms are reasonable to deem that their risks of contagion are higher when
their industries are dominated by small firms, especially when their stakeholders are
highly sensitive to safety issues, such as product/customer, operations/employees,
or society/environment safety.
Given that similarity is the key driver of contagion, managers in highly
commoditized industries should be more alert to contagion. Differentiating and/or
publicizing the differences can help managers mitigate the fear of their lay
stakeholders. Transparency and visibility of the supply chain enables stakeholders
to identify and recognize the differences between the firm and its rivals; however,
managers should be careful about the extent of information they share with their
stakeholders. Some information may be misinterpreted by the stakeholders and
mislead them. Too much information can confuse the stakeholders and lead to an
unfavourable outcome by masking the key information.
It is critical for managers to identify initiation and triggering events to address
contagion risk. Managers can recognize the events by reviewing the cases of
contagion, not only in their own industries, but also other industries. Some events
affect most of the industries in the same manner. For example, counterfeiting is an
issue that can hurt all firms when it is detected in a market.
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Finally, the fact that contagion can affect all firms in an industry provides an
outstanding opportunity for collaboration among rivals. Such collaboration can
improve the safety of the industry by increasing the minimum safety requirements,
and/or helping rivals that are struggling with safety issues to enhance their safety
levels. Such collaboration can lead to safer products and operations, higher safetyinvestment returns, and ultimately, a more sustainable economy.
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